CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF POLICE IN PHILADELPHIA:

The First 50 Years

Bruria Tal

A Monograph

Executive Summary

November 2003
Acknowledgements

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* The author is a researcher and writer in Philadelphia, with a Communications and Political Science background. An interest in issues of communication between citizens and government bureaucracies led to this study. The entire Monograph will be published in Spring 2004.
The Philadelphia Experience with Civilian Oversight

Civilian oversight, irrespective of its form, has as its more general objective to provide the police with an external, independent and community-based point of view that represents the public, the ultimate consumer of the police service and the ultimate source from which the police power is derived (Soto, 2001a).

The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (1981) emphasized in the late 1970s issues of police – community relations. By then Philadelphia’s City administration already had “preceded the nation, …” (Gilhool, 1984). Mayor J. Richardson Dilworth had established in 1958 the Police Review Board (the ‘Board’) as a civilian oversight entity to review police - community issues. Mayor James H. J. Tate, in response to political pressures, then disbanded the renamed Police Advisory Board in 1969 (Terrill, 1982).


The Commission’s establishment was preceded by decades of public protests, and legal and community activism that reactively protested incidents of police misconduct. Between the late 1960s and the early 1990s, City administrations reactively responded to high-profile police misconduct cases with ad-hoc investigative commissions, City Council public hearings, and legislative initiatives for some form of civilian oversight. The Police Advisory Commission’s mandate to investigate complaints and study police
policies and procedures incorporates both reactive and proactive aspects of civilian oversight aimed at improving police – community relations.

Civilian Oversight as a 1950s ‘Pioneering Venture’

The first Philadelphia civilian oversight board was considered in the 1950s a ‘pioneering venture’ and a municipal government ‘innovation’ (Tate, 1969). It was the City’s administrative response to citizens’ complaints that had accumulated during the 1950s over “excess zeal being showed by the policemen. …” (Coxe, 1961:142).

Councilman Henry W. Sawyer III (at the time also serving as the local ACLU’s president) introduced an ordinance in City Council on June 7, 1957 to create a civilian review board. When City Council delayed legislative action, Mayor J. Richardson Dilworth established the Police Review Board (the ‘Board’) by executive order in October 1958. The Board was to “not only benefit the citizens but the Police Department as well because no one could say it was whitewashing complaints.” The Board’s goal was to improve police – community relations, and as a “safety valve” to release tensions in an era of urban turmoil (Boardman et al, 1966:10; Gammage, 1993).
Mayor Dilworth appointed the Board’s initial five officers\(^1\). The Board consisted of five officers until 1959, with three officers constituting a quorum. In November 1961, with the numbers of complaints rising, Mayor Dilworth increased the number of Board officers to eight\(^2\). It then functioned as two separate three-member panels. The Board accepted both new complaints and appeals of the results of police investigations of complaints filed with the Police Department (Morisey, 1963; Coxe, 1965; Boardman, et al., 1966; Barton, 1970; Small, 1980:8).

The Board’s budget in 1959 was $4,000. Martin Barol, Esq., served as its first, part-time, executive director. By 1962 a $15,227.00 budget allowed the hiring of a full time executive director and a stenographer, and to maintain a formal office.

In March 1963 Mayor Tate nominated the Reverend Dr. William H. Gray, Jr., as the Board’s first full time executive director. Dr. Gray left in January 1, 1965, to serve as Civil Commissioner of Philadelphia. The next executive director, Clarence Farmer, a prominent black community leader, was appointed only in June 1965. Farmer served
until 1969, when he was appointed executive director of the Philadelphia Human Relations Commission (Hudson, 1968; Small, 1980).

The Board accepted complaints against police, ascertained their validity, and recommended disciplinary action to the Police Department via the Managing Director, the City Solicitor, and the Mayor. The Board had no power of subpoena; complainants had to bring their own witnesses to hearings. Complaints had to be in writing and could be withdrawn only with approval of at least two Board officers to lessen possibilities of both police intimidation and civil rights militancy. The Police Department’s Community Relations Unit usually investigated complaints for the Board (Morisey, 1963:15). Clarence Farmer recalled the Board’s major problems as:

“[a lack of] a real budget and no investigators. … We had to rely on the police to conduct investigations. That’s not the best way to operate a board.” (Lewis, 1993).

Hearings were held at least once a month with three Board officers present. Complainants had to be represented at the Board hearings by legal counsel. When no formal legal counsel was available, Board officers, or the executive director, provided legal representation by examining witnesses on behalf of the complainant. Police
officers were accompanied by a member of the FOP, and usually also by an attorney provided by the FOP. Recommendations were sent to the Mayor with copies to the Police Commissioner and the City’s Managing Director (Coxe, 1961:149; Beral and Sisk, 1964:513; Kobus, 1964:11; Boardman, 1966:29).

The Board, in its recommendations on complaints against individual officers’ actions, included suggestions relating to overall police practices and policies. The police commissioner then decided on the action to be taken, although Mayoral approval was needed for actions that differed from the Board’ recommendations. Only once did the Board recommend dismissal of a police officer (Terrill, 1982).

Since Mayor Dilworth had not formulated any regulations and procedures for the Board, it had to develop its modus operandi based on its operational experiences. The Board rules and procedures were changed and amended several times and in a variety of ways over the years of its existence (Boardman, et al., 1966; Hudson, 1968).

Citizens, civic groups, public officials and employees could file complaints. The Board accepted both new complaints and appeals of the results of investigations of complaints filed with the Police Department (City of Philadelphia, 1959, 1966; Boardman, et al., 1966; Barton, 1970; Small, 1980:8-10). Many complaint cases were “lost,” or discontinued for some reason because of “the sporadic operations of the PAB itself, which has often fallen behind in its work because of the court injunctions and vacancies in the office of the executive secretary. No doubt many complainants became disenchanted with the delay or decided that nothing was going to come of their complaint and so withdrew.” (Hudson, 1968:24).

The Philadelphia Police had made about 800,000 arrests between 1958 and 1965. Compared to this, only 271 complaints were filed with the Board. The relatively low
number of complaints was attributed to a lack of funds needed to increase public awareness of the Board’s existence (Boardman, et al., 1966:95).

The Fraternal Order of the Police (FOP) filed lawsuits against the Board in 1959, 1965, and 1967. The 1959 suit was settled out of court by change of name from Police Review Board (PRB) to Police Advisory Board (PAB). The 1965 suit, alleging that the Board was unconstitutional, froze its activities until early 1966. The third suit in 1967 halted hearings until 1968. These delays discouraged people from filings of complaints. The Board’s lessened “relevancy” made it easier for Mayor Tate to disband it on December 22, 1969 by executive order (Wallace, 1991). Ironically, the 1968 national Kerner Commission report had recommended civilian review boards as a means to control police abuse, a major cause of the 1960s riots across the U.S.A (Wilson, 1993).

Mercer Dunbar Tate was Board Chair in 1967 when a city judge ruled that Mayor Dilworth’s creation of the Board had been illegal. The State Supreme Court reversed that decision years later, and Mercer Tate battled to reactivate the Board. Mayor Tate decided to let then Police Commissioner Frank Rizzo handle police abuse complaints. Mercer Tate (no relation to the Mayor) called this “an abdication [of Mayor Tate’s] responsibility to Commissioner Rizzo, and … a very unwise choice.” (Wallace, 1991).

During 1992s public debates accompanying City Council’s hearings, Martin Barol described the Mayor’s leadership as essential to the Board’s efficacy:

“The board, I thought, was successful when Dilworth was the mayor. There was a real effort to make the [police] sensitive to the fact that they’re dealing with different types of people, people with different ethnic backgrounds. … I felt it was a good attempt to do the right thing, and to help people. … The concept was that there’s a place to go if you’re being mistreated by government. If somebody in the Prothonotary’s Office mistreated you, it’s not the same as if a guy with a gun and badge mistreated you.” (Gammage, 1993).
Decades of Various Civilian Review Mechanisms

“… We have had our scandals in the ‘70s, in the 80s, and now …. in the ‘90s, … I don’t want this to repeat, that we have a scandal, there’s a public outcry, there are bold statements made and it subsides, then several years down the road, maybe a decade down the road, there’s another scandal. …” (Mayor Rendell, quoted by Fazlollah, 1996).

Between 1969 and 1994 complaints were filed mostly through the police department’s Internal Affairs Division (PAC, 2000:2). The Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations reviewed some complaints (Kleit, 2003). Edward G. Rendell established a police-misconduct unit in the District Attorney’s office in 1978, which was abolished in 1984 (Cooke and Weiner, 1984).

City Council rejected in 1980 Councilman John Anderson’s bill no. 12. It had recommended the establishment of a commission, or “a complaint procedure.” However, Mayor William Green, who had supported such a bill in general terms during his 1979 campaign, included its details in his 1980 Police Directive no. 127, the foundation of the Police Department’s handling of complaints until 1993 (Coxe, 1992; McDonald, 1992).

In 1984 Mayor Wilson Goode considered creating a municipal unit, composed of police officers and government officials, to deal with allegations of police abuse. The FOP rejected the initiative (Cooke and Weiner, 1984). Several ad-hoc commissions dealt with specific high-profile issues, such as MOVE in 1985, and the 39th district corruption in 1988-9 (Cooke and Weiner, 1984; McDonald, 1993a).

Three particularly disastrous police actions led the ACLU to organize in 1985 the first Coalition of Police Accountability (CPA), representing various groups:
• “Operation Cold Turkey,” a police sweep of 50 corners in minority neighborhoods;
• The police sweep of a Puerto Rican neighborhood after the killing of a police officer;
• The police actions at the MOVE house in West Philadelphia in 1985.

In the mid-1980s then CPA representatives met occasionally with Police Commissioners Kevin Tucker and Willie L. Williams, and other upper level police officials, to discuss policies and procedures. The first CPA organization disbanded in the late 1980s (CPA, June 24, 1992).

By 1992 Philadelphia’s issues of police – community relations resembled the nation-wide issues of increasing allegations of police misconduct. According to the Philadelphia Police Department’s Internal Affairs Unit, complaints of physical abuse by officers had increased by 37% from 1989 to 1991 (Gammage, 1992:B01).

The ACLU reconvened the CPA in 1992 following several high-profile police incidents:
• Beatings of “Act Up” protesters during a demonstration on September 12, 1991;
• The June 1992 killing of Charles Matthews in his West Philadelphia home.
• The “Organized Crime Intelligence Unit’s” photo file of Asian-American youth.
• Revelations of corruptions at the 39th district since 1987.

The 1990s CPA represented about 30 community and legal groups “committed to ending the police abuse against citizens.” The city had spent more than $3 million to settle complaints in 1992. The CPA proposed a permanent police advisory board to investigate citizens’ complaints, and to review police policies and practices (ACLU,
The Citizens Crime Commission of Delaware Valley, after reviewing for nine-months with the Police Department on how its Internal Affairs Unit (IAD) handled complaints, supported the creation of such a civilian advisory board (McDonald, 1993a).

Clarence Farmer asserted during 1992s public debates the renewed need for civilian oversight of police:

“We were needed then and something is needed now. … It would be a safety valve. It gives people a place to go with their complaints. A lot of people felt that the police weren’t capable of policing themselves honestly. People still feel that way today. The perception of the police, in some parts of the city, has not changed as much as you might think.” (Lewis, 1993).

A particular impetus to the 1993 establishment of the Commission was provided by revelations of corruption at the 39th district of the Philadelphia police department since 1987 (Fazlollah and Jones, 1995). After months of negotiations between the City and civil rights organizations, a reform plan for the police department was constituted, described by Mayor Rendell as “the most ambitious anti-corruption program undertaken by the Philadelphia Police Department in its history. … “ (Fazlollah, 1996).

Councilman Michael Nutter sponsored the 1990s legislation in City Council to reestablish a civilian oversight board and to strengthen Police Department procedures for handling citizen complaints of officer misconduct. On September 18, 1992, Councilman Nutter introduced two bills, or city ordinances, no. 317 and no. 297 to that effect (McDonald, 1992; CPA, October 19, 1992).

On June 10, 1993, City Council, overriding Mayor Rendell’s veto passed Bill no. 317 creating a “Police Advisory Board,” and Bill no. 297 defining Police Department complaint handling procedures. Passage of both bills was followed by negotiations
between City Council and the Mayor on the oversight issues as well as the handling of citizen complaints by the Police Department. In October 1993, Mayor Rendell signed Executive Order 8-93 that established the Police Advisory Commission, and companion Executive Order 9-93 that established internal procedures for handling of citizen complaints by the Police Department (McDonald, 1993c; City of Philadelphia, 2000).

The Police Advisory Commission Since 1993

On January 1, 1994, Mayor Edward G. Rendell formed the Police Advisory Commission to improve police community relations and to investigate individual civilian complaints (City of Philadelphia, 2002). The Commission met first officially in February 1994, and began operations on July 1, 1994. Its first Executive Director, Charles P. Kluge, a retired FBI agent, started work on August 29, 1994, along with William J. Smith, as Special Investigator, and Peggy A. Haley as Executive Assistant.

Over the ten years following its establishment the Commission faced some existence-threatening challenges. Particularly in the aftermath of the DeJesus report, Mayor Rendell, Police Commissioners Neal and Timoney, District Attorney Abraham, and FOP officials aimed scathing criticism at the Commission. Chairwoman Jane L. Dalton perceived the criticism as an expected occupational hazard:

“We knew we were going to be criticized when we did our work. We were prepared for that. … I think that [criticism by Rendell and Neal] was an attempt to refocus the attention from what was being done, and that was the disciplining of officers. …” (Jones, 1996:B01).

Commission member Juan Ramos conceded that there was room

“[for the Commission doing] a better job. …But we want the Police Department to do a better job as well. …” (Jones, 1996:B01).
Relations between the Commission and the Police Department’s IAD appeared competitive at times, as in this account of Commission and IAD investigations:

“[The] Mulero case, as it is known, [is] particularly interesting for two reasons. First, it involves former officer Christopher DiPasquale, the last Philadelphia cop to be fired for killing an unarmed civilian. Secondly, if the commission is correct in its findings, then Timoney’s own Internal Affairs goofed badly in June of 1998 when it determined that Mulero’s complaint of physical abuse by DiPasquale was ‘not sustained.’ …” (Weyrich, 1999).

Relations with the Police Department posed some critical problems over the years. Commissioner Willie L. Williams who had left in June 1992 for Los Angeles, had been succeeded by Commissioner Richard Neal. Some experts considered Commissioner Neal’s consistently strict use of disciplinary actions against officers as an important consideration against a “paper tiger” advisory board with mostly advisory powers (McDonald, 1993b). Commissioner Richard Neil retired in 1998.

Commissioner John Timoney took office in March 1998. He tended to reject every Commission recommendation for police officer disciplinary actions. The Commission’s then new Executive Director, Hector W. Soto, noted that in 16 of 17 cases Commissioner Timoney had either ignored the proposed personnel disciplinary actions, or substituted “re-training” for the officers in question (Conroy, 2000; City of Philadelphia, 2001). Commissioner Sylvester M. Johnson became the 13th Police Commissioner of the City of Philadelphia on January 4th, 2002, and the Police Department’s relationship with the Commission assumed a more cooperative mode.

In April 1995, in response to the Commission’s completion of its first major investigation – the 1993 beating death of DeJesus, the FOP sued Mayor Rendell and the Commission. The FOP claimed that the Commission was an advisory, not an
investigative entity, and that Mayor Rendell had violated the City Charter by appointing it. This interpretation was rejected by the city administration, the Commission, and eventually the Courts. Overall, between 1995 and 1999, the FOP filed five lawsuits against the Commission, challenging its authority to investigate police conduct and procedures. The Courts rejected the lawsuits (City of Philadelphia, 2000).

Until the 2002 change in its presidency, the FOP continued to oppose the Commission even though the latter’s mandate had been reinforced by court decisions and Commissioner John F. Timoney’s General Order no. 7595 of June 1998. Robert V. Eddis, a former FOP official, assumed the FOP presidency in 2002. The Commission’s recent Chairman William T. Cannon commented on the changing nature of the Commission’s relations with the Police Commissioner and the FOP:

“Commissioner Timoney was a hostile police commissioner, who obviously resented us. FOP president Costello was also very hostile towards the Police Advisory Commission. Now both the new commissioner and the new FOP president exhibit more cooperative behavior towards the Police Advisory Commission.” (Cannon, 2002).

Several top-level administrative changes have taken place at the Commission since 1994. Charles P. Kluge left the Commission in April 1998. William J. Smith, the Commission’s Chief Investigator, served as Acting Director until August 1998. Hector W. Soto, a New York civil rights lawyer, and former director of New York’s Civilian Complaint Review Board, was appointed to head the Commission in August 1998.

The Commission’s Chair since February 1994, Jane Dalton, Esq., stepped down in March 2002, and continues to serve as a regular Commission officer. William T. Cannon, Esq., the Vice-Chair, assumed the chairmanship in March 2002. He stepped down in May 2003. Robert Nix, Esq., presently serves as the Commission’s Chair.
The Commission’s board of officers consists of 15 permanent members and four alternate members, all of whom are appointed by the Mayor. However, seven of the permanent and two of the alternate members must be appointed from a list of nominees provided by City Council. Commission officers serve without compensation for a term of four years (City of Philadelphia, 2002).

The current Commission’s organization consists of six full-time employees: Hector W. Soto, Esq., Executive Director; William Johnson, Deputy Director; Kelvyn Anderson, Director of Information Services; Ana Sostre and Wellington Stubbs II, Special Investigators; Jeanette Bennett, Administrative Assistant. The Commission also trains annually several interns from various organizations (City of Philadelphia, 2002).

The report of the 2001 Mayor’s Task Force on Police Discipline states that the “Commission’s] “powers and duties include, inter alia: (i) advising the City’s Managing Director and Police Commissioner “on policies and actions of the Police Department;” (ii) improv[ing] the relationship between the Police Department and the community;” (iii) reviewing “individual incidents” of police misconduct; and (iv) studying “broader issues … of concern to the community, the Police Department, or the Police Commissioner.” (Epps, 2001:49).

Between 1994 and 2003 the Commission initiated or completed numerous public panel hearings on citizens’ complaints. 27 of those time- and labor-intensive public panel hearings were conducted between 1998 and 2001. The Commission has also conducted two public issues hearings, and published the resulting reports. The first public issues hearing on Police Stress in 1995 resulted in a 60-page report. The second public issues hearing, related to the police department’s acquisition and execution of premises search and arrest warrants, resulted in a report that was published in 2001 (Soto, 2001c:4).
The Commission’s role was to be advisory according to Mayor Rendell’s amended Executive Order 8-93. Hector W. Soto, the Commission’s Executive Director, commented on its mission before the 2001 Mayor’s Task Force on Police Discipline,

“[as one of] helping to improve the relationship between the Philadelphia Police Department and the general public. … the Police Advisory Commission became [in 1993], and continues to the present to be the official voice of the independent, external point of view of the Philadelphia citizen, the primary consumer and underwriter of the City’s police service.” (Soto, 2001b).

Hector Soto differentiated between the Commission’s and the Police Department’s functions in relation to investigating citizens’ complaints against police in the larger contexts of police – community relations and issues of civil rights in the USA:

“From the beginning [in 1993], the Commission was not intended to be a duplication of IAD, nor of the para-military, organizational point of view of the police department’s bureaucracy or hierarchy. The Commission was created in response to [a variety] of problematic events involving the police department, like the 39th District scandal [of 1988-9], and the by-
product, a growing lack of confidence in the department’s ability to police itself. Today that is a serious problem shared by many municipalities as recently documented by the US Commission on Civil Rights in their report on police practices and civil rights in America, … Furthermore [in response to the legal challenges by the FOP], the City agreed and recognized that ‘the maintenance of the Police Advisory Commission is important to strengthening the public confidence in Police Department activity and oversight.’ …“ (Soto, 2001c:).

By Summer 2002, the Commission had received almost 1400 complaints, and had conducted hundreds of investigations since it began full operations in mid-1994.

Complaints filed with the Commission had increased by almost 102% since 1997, a year when only 91 complaints had been filed. The Commission received 164 complaints during fiscal year 2002 (FY02), an almost 11% decrease in the number of complaints from the 184 complaints filed the previous year. Of the 164 complaints filed, the Commission accepted 112 for investigation. At the close of the fiscal year 2002 there were 170 pending complaint investigations: 112 were active investigations; another 42 were awaiting closure (City of Philadelphia, 2002).

Diagram 1 presents the inquiry/complaint process from intake through disposition and post-disposition distribution. Table 1 provides a longitudinal overview of complaints filed over the first eight years of the Commission’s ongoing operations (City of Philadelphia, 2002).
Diagram 1: The Inquiry/complaint process from Intake through Disposition and post-disposition distribution

### Table 1: OVERVIEW OF COMPLAINTS FILED 1995-2002 (PAC, 2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>FY95</th>
<th>FY96</th>
<th>FY97</th>
<th>FY98</th>
<th>FY99</th>
<th>FY00</th>
<th>FY01</th>
<th>FY02</th>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>131</strong></td>
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<td><strong>94</strong></td>
<td><strong>107</strong></td>
<td><strong>147</strong></td>
<td><strong>172</strong></td>
<td><strong>184</strong></td>
<td><strong>164</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Epilogue: Accountability and Civilian Oversight

“Under our system and theory of government, public employees and officials are presumed to be held accountable for their actions, i.e., for positive acts they perform or for their failure to perform certain required acts. …” (Lohman, et al., 1966).

The notion of police accountability that provides the base for the Commission’s existence and operations has been steadily gaining public recognition, since its start in Philadelphia in the 1950s, in the wake of publicity of several local and national high-profile incidents involving brutality, corruption, racial profiling, and shootings. These incidents have been the focus of the reports on police practices of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (1981, 2000).

The concept of police accountability is grounded in the principles of formal governmental “checks and balances,” and is tied to the Constitution’s Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. By establishing the civilian review agencies, in addition to the various special-issue ad-hoc commissions, Philadelphia’s civic leadership recognized the need to create a neutral forum for citizens to file their complaints and to accept the outcomes of the investigations. Civilian review emphasizes that the Police Department, like other government agencies, are accountable to the citizenry, and that mutual respect and cooperation are essential for improving police-community relations.
Appendix A

Community Lines of Police Accountability

An inquiry into the shooting of a black teenager in Evanston, Illinois, in 1969, produced a report *Who is Responsible for the Shooting?* which reflects some of the frustrations and the quest for clearer lines of police accountability (quoted in Goldstein, 1977:136-7):

*The Police Officer?* Ultimately, it was his decision. But he made it within a framework of “duty” supplied by the Evanston Police Department. He acted as he was trained to act, and the officer that takes his place will be trained in the same way.

*The Chief of Police?* The Chief of Police makes the policy decisions for the Evanston Police Department, including the policy governing the use of firearms. However, the police department reports to the City Manager, and the Chief of Police can be fired or counseled in his decisions by the City Manager.

*The City Manager?* He has the direct responsibility for police administration. But even he reports to higher authority, the City Mayor and City Council.

*The City Mayor and City Council?* The mayor is the city’s chief executive officer. Most mayors have avoided controversial issues involving the police by deferring to the autonomy the police are commonly assumed to have. Those who have sympathized with criticism of the police and have sought to change police policies have often suffered serious political setbacks. And there is a tendency, especially by the rank-and-file police, to claim that the city’s chief executive’s effort to influence police operations constitutes the very kind of political interference from which the police should be shielded. In several large cities (Minneapolis and Philadelphia, for example) the political power of the police and the support they have been able to enlist have resulted in police personnel being elected mayor.

The City Council is the policy-making body for all branches of city government. They had made not policy decisions that would have prevented the shooting of the teenager. These decision-makers were elected by Evanston citizens and must reflect the views of their constituents to remain in office.

*The Citizens of Evanston?* Evanston citizens as a whole had not demonstrated dissatisfaction by demanding a review of the police policy, or participation in determining that policy. There is nowhere else to place responsibility – the citizens of Evanston would have to assume it.
Exhibit B

First Complaint Form of the Police Review Commission in 1958

Exhibit C

Present Complaint form of the Police Advisory Commission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CITIZEN’S COMPLAINT/REPORT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Complainant’s Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Zip Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Phone Number Home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Emergency Phone#</td>
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<tr>
<td>(9) Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(11) Sex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(13) Social Security #</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(16) Date of Incident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(18) Describe Incident in Detail____________________</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Use Continuation Sheet if necessary)

(19) State name, address, phone number(s) of witness(es), if known ____________________________

(20) Name/Badge# of Officer(s) __________ (21) Car Number __________

KNOWLINGLY PROVIDING FALSE INFORMATION WILL VOID THIS COMPLAINT AND MAY SUBJECT YOU TO A CHARGE OF PERJURY

Signature of Complainant______________________________

(TO BE COMPLETED BY THE POLICE ADVISORY COMMISSION)

Date/Time Received__ Intake Person__ Source__

City of Philadelphia
Police Advisory Commission
P.O. Box 147
Philadelphia, PA 19105-0147
215-686-3991

Source: The Police Advisory Commission, 2003
Bibliography

American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), May, 22, 1992.


Fazlollah, Mark and Richard Jones. “Suit will ask U.S. court to take over city police reform. The ACLU and NAACP said it would be filed next week. It seeks to enjoin police from rights abuses,” *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, December 7, 1995:A01.


Kleit, Lazar H. Interview in person, March 5, 2003.


**Notes and References**

1 The initial five Board officers, appointed by Mayor Dilworth in 1958, were: Dr. Thorsten Sellin, Chairman of the Department of Sociology of the University of Pennsylvania and Trustee of the Philadelphia County Prisons; Mr. William T. Coleman, Jr., attorney, Trustee of the United Fund and Secretary of the Judicial Committee of the Philadelphia Bar Association; Mr. William Ross, member of the Philadelphia Joint Board of the International Ladies Garment Workers’ Union; Clarence E. Pickett, executive secretary of the American Friends Service Committee; Monsignor Edward M. Reilly, superintendent of Parochial Schools, Archdiocese of Philadelphia (Boardman et al, 1966:15-16; 31-33).

2 The eight Board officers, appointed by Mayor Dilworth in 1961, were: Dr. Thorsten Sellin, Clarence Pickett, William Ross, Mrs. Maurice C. Clifford, civic leader; Charles W. Bowser, attorney and director of the Philadelphia Anti-Poverty Action Committee; Thomas B. Harper, III, attorney; the Reverend W. Carter Merbrier, pastor of St. Matthew’s Lutheran Church; Mercer D. Tate, attorney (chairman of the Board from December 1964 to 1968); Mrs. Callie O. Harper, prominent religious leader; Dr. William M. Kephart, professor of sociology, University of Pennsylvania, and author of *Racial Factors and Urban Law Enforcement*; Marvin Comisky, Esq., chancellor, Philadelphia Bar Association; and Joseph J. Glennon, businessman (Boardman et al., 1966:31).

As of May 1966, the eight Board officers were: Mercer D. Tate, Esq., chairman; Eugene C. Conlan, salesman for Youngstown Sheet and Tube; C. Laurence Cushmore, Jr., attorney; Dr. Albert H. Hobbs, associate professor of sociology, University of Pennsylvania; the Reverend Angel Luis Jaime, Pastor of the Evangelical Church of Christ; James A. Ippoliti, former executive secretary of the Police Clothing Board; Harold L. Pilgrim, retired government official and executive secretary of Frontiers of America; and James N. Reaves, retired police captain (Boardman et al., 1966:32).

3 PHRC continues to review some types of citizen complaints against police as they relate to allegations of discrimination in provision of city services, or involving neighbor disputes in which the subject of the complaint happens to be a police officer (Greenwood, 2003; Kleit, 2003; Lawton, 2003).

4 Philadelphia lawyers, backed by the NAACP’s and the ACLU’s local chapters, and North Philadelphia’s Police-Barrio project, filed in 1995 a class action suit in federal court alleging a history of racism, corruption, and abuse of civil liberties, “coupled with a collapse of internal discipline,” at the police department. These lawyers included NAACP’s Earl W. Trent, the ACLU’s Stefan Presser, private practitioner Alan Yatvin, and David Rudovsky, a University of Pennsylvania law professor. The Police-Barrio project was represented by its executive director, Will Gonzales (Fazlollah and Jones, December 7, 1995:A01).
As part of the reform plan an Integrity and Accountability Office (IAO) was created as a semi-independent unit within the police department to identify systemic deficiencies. The IAO can audit Police Department policies and practices related to the detection and control of misconduct and corruption, formulate recommendations, and publish special issues reports (Ceisler, 2001).

Ordinance # 317 proposed the creation of a Police Advisory Board, outside the Police Department, empowered to investigate allegations of police abuse, publicize its findings, recommend appropriate discipline, and recommend policy changes. Ordinance 297 required the Police Department itself to follow detailed procedures for handling complaints of abuse that “would prevent any complaints from being ignored or the complainants from being left in the dark about the outcome.” (CPA, October 19, 1992).

The 15 officers appointed by Mayor Rendell to the Commission’s first Board were: Jane Leslie Dalton, Esq., Chair; W. Bruce Beaton, businessman; Irene Benedetti, Temple University employee and jewelry designer; William T. Cannon, Esq., former assistant district attorney; Dorothy F. Cousins, retired police inspector; Eddie T. Graham, Mount Airy founder and coordinator of his neighborhood Town Watch; Charles C. Harris, retired police lieutenant; Bruce W. Kauffman, Esq., former state Supreme Court justice (had served as a member of the 1985 MOVE Commission); Carmen M. Marrero, school counselor and community activist; Kevin M. Pasquay, auditor and financial consultant; Juan F. Ramos, a construction supervisor and longtime Latino police-community relations activist; Vivian Ray, psychologist; Paul M. Uyehara, Esq.; Novella Williams, community activist; William Wood, restaurantor. The alternative appointments were: Ronald A. Burton, social worker; Rev. Jerome Cooper, pastor; Mary Ellen Krober, Esq.; Judith Savitt, retired school teacher (Gammage, 1994).

The Commission’s relations with the Police Department reached a critical point when the Police Advisory Commission requested Mayor Street’s involvement in resolving their differences in 2000 (Moran, 2000).

The officers of the Commission’s board serving at present are: Robert Nix, Esq., Chair; Charles C. Harris, a retired police lieutenant; Vice Chair; May Ellen Krober, Esq., Vice Chair; Jane Dalton, Esq., chair and member emeritus; William T. Cannon, Esq., chair and member emeritus; Carmen Marrero, a school counselor; Dorothy F. Cousins, a retired police inspector; Paul Uyehara, Esq.; Joseph T. Stapleton, Esq., Ronald Burton, Ph.D.; Vivian Ray, Ph.D.; Michael Weiss, a businessman; Reverend Robert P. Shine Sr., Novella Willaims, community activist; Anthony K. “Rocko” Holloway, director of special projects for PAAN.