



# **PHILADELPHIA FIRE DEPARTMENT**

## **INVESTIGATIVE REPORT**

**BOX 6542 WOOLSTON AVENUE AND MIDDLETON STREET**

**1655 MIDDLETON STREET**

**DECEMBER 9, 2014**

**LINE OF DUTY DEATH**

**FIREFIGHTER JOYCE CRAIG**

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## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

### **INVESTIGATIVE TEAM:**

**Deputy Chief Ted Mueller, Health and Safety Officer**

**Deputy Chief Harry J. Bannan, Fire Marshal**

### **CONTRIBUTORS:**

**Battalion Chief Michael Bonner, Deputy Fire Marshal**

**Deputy Chief James Bonner, Division 1, Platoon A**

**Deputy Chief Robert Wilkins, Division 1, Platoon B**

**Deputy Chief Gary Loesch, Division 1, Platoon C**

**Deputy Chief Joseph McGraw, Division 1, Platoon D**

## **BIOGRAPHICAL DATA**

### **FIREFIGHTER JOYCE CRAIG**

Firefighter Joyce Craig was born September 7<sup>th</sup>, 1977. She was 37 years old when she died in the Line of Duty.

Firefighter Joyce Craig was appointed to the Philadelphia Fire Department on December 8<sup>th</sup>, 2003.

After graduating from the Philadelphia Fire Academy, 178th Cadet Class, Firefighter Joyce Craig was assigned to Engine Company 9, Platoon A, on March 1<sup>st</sup>, 2004. Firefighter Joyce Craig was also assigned to the following Engine and Ladder Companies during her career:

Engine Company 45 - from July 25<sup>th</sup>, 2006 to February 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2011.

Ladder Company 21 - from February 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2011 to July 8<sup>th</sup>, 2012.

Engine Company 64 - from July 8<sup>th</sup>, 2012 to December 9<sup>th</sup>, 2014.

Firefighter Joyce Craig leaves behind 2 children, son, Mekhi Green, 17 and daughter, Laylani Lewis, 23 months.



## **VOLUME I**

- I. SUMMARY**
- II. THE INVESTIGATION**
- III. PHOTOGRAPHS**
- IV. DIAGRAMS**
- V. PHILADELPHIA FIRE DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS**
- VI. FINDINGS**
- VII. CAUSES**
- VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS**
- IX. CHRONOLOGICAL FIRE DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS**
- X. RADIO TRANSMISSION TIME LINE**

## **I. SUMMARY**

On Tuesday, December 9, 2014 at 0249, the Philadelphia Fire Department's Fire Communication Center received a phone call from the 74 year old female occupant of 1655 Middleton Street, Philadelphia Pennsylvania. She stated that she had a fire in the basement of her residence. She was the sole occupant at the time. At 0249, Tactical Box 6542 was transmitted for a dwelling fire at this location.

1655 Middleton Street is a 2 story in the front, 3 stories in the rear, row house style dwelling of ordinary construction. The property is approximately 18 feet wide by 35 feet long. The property was built in 1925.

The fire originated in the basement recreation room. The kitchen / basement door was left open by the occupant. Although instructed by the 911 call taker to "get out", the occupant stood by the front entrance door to await the arrival of the Fire Department. The front entrance door remained open, as well. The basement east end window was removed by the 1st arriving Ladder Company, the rear basement west end entrance door was forced open by the 2nd due Engine Company, and it remained open throughout the incident. These factors, coupled with a large fire load in the basement recreation room, and an average wind speed of 16.3 mph out of the northeast, created a large, fast moving fire with heavy smoke conditions and zero visibility.

The fire grew to fully involve the entire recreation room. The fire then extended up the basement stairs and into the 1st floor kitchen, dining room, and living room. The 1st floor was heavily damaged by the fire. The fire spread via an interior ventilation shaft to involve and damage the ceiling / roof void space, or cockloft, as well.

Firefighter Joyce Craig, working at Engine Company 73 this day, became trapped by these conditions. Firefighter Joyce Craig was found unconscious in the 1st floor dining room of the property at 03:15:21. Firefighter Joyce Craig's Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) was found with a burn through hole in the low pressure buddy breathing hose, which depleted her air supply. Firefighter Joyce Craig was removed from the building by her fellow Firefighters and transported to Albert Einstein Hospital by a Philadelphia Fire Department Medic Unit, where she was pronounced deceased.

## **II. INVESTIGATION**

On Tuesday December 09, 2014 at 02:49, Engine 73 responded to a reported dwelling fire at 1655 Middleton Street. While operating on Box 6542, Firefighter Joyce Craig sustained fatal injuries.

Firefighter Joyce Craig was assigned to Engine 64 Platoon "C". Firefighter Joyce Craig was working an overtime shift at Engine 73, Platoon "A" that began at 2000 on December 09, 2014 before responding on Box 6542.

The PFD Health and Safety Officer was notified at 0500 by the Fire Communication Center (FCC) to respond to Box 6542 for a reported Line Of Duty Death. Deputy Chief Ted Mueller, Health and Safety Officer arrived on the fire ground and began the investigation, with on scene Fire Marshals. Firefighter Joyce Craig had been transported to an area hospital prior to the arrival of the Health and Safety Officer.

On Wednesday, December 10, 2014, Philadelphia Fire Commissioner Derrick J.V. Sawyer ordered Deputy Chief Ted Mueller, Health and Safety Officer and Deputy Chief Harry J. Bannan, Fire Marshal to complete an investigation into the Line Of Duty Death of Firefighter Joyce Craig.

The investigation process began with documenting the scene, interviewing the members who responded to the incident, and collecting physical evidence. The following items, records, documents, and photographs were collected, examined, and evaluated during the investigation:

- Interviews with members who operated at the scene.
- Interviews conducted by the Philadelphia Fire Marshal's Office, Philadelphia Police Department, and United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives.
- Fire Communication's dispatcher recordings and time lines.
- Philadelphia Fire Department North Fire and North Tac 1 recordings and time lines.
- Philadelphia Fire Department incident history printout.
- Philadelphia Fire Department Fire Marshal's Investigation Report.
- Medical Examiner's Findings and Opinions – Case #14-04923 (Autopsy).
- National Weather Service Weather Report.
- Philadelphia Fire Department National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS) Report.
- Photographs of the fire dwelling and equipment.
- Sketches, notes, and drawings made from the scene.
- Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and tools recovered at the scene.
- Test results from National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) on Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) worn by Firefighter Joyce Craig, as well as the other 3 SCBAs assigned to Engine 73 (Task#20003).
- Development of a Multiple Event Sequence Log.

In addition, the following resources were used:

- Philadelphia Fire Department Fire Communications Center.
- Philadelphia Fire Department Visual Communications Unit.
- National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health.
- Philadelphia Medical Examiner's Office.
- Philadelphia Police Department.
- United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives.

The Fire Marshal's Office and Line of Duty Death Investigation Team maintained control of the fire dwelling for approximately seven days, to conduct a thorough examination. Information from interviews with members, physical evidence, photographs, incident history printouts, audiotapes, and the knowledge and experience of the Line Of Duty Death Investigation Team were used to complete the investigation.

As with any investigation of this magnitude and gravity, there may be inconsistencies and conflicting statements among members interviewed. It is the opinion of the Line of Duty Death Investigation Team that these inconsistencies are the result of differing perspectives, varying memories, and emotional factors. They do not result from any attempt to intentionally mislead, distort, or conceal facts.

It is not the intention of this report to place blame on any person, group, or agency. The intention of this report is to determine the facts, identify the critical factors that occurred during this incident, and then make recommendations to prevent such an incident from occurring in the future.

### **III. PHOTOGRAPHS**

<b>PHOTO</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
<b>1</b>	<b>1655 MIDDLETON ST. FRONT - ROW OF DWELLINGS</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>1655 MIDDLETON ST. / FRONT OF DWELLING</b>
<b>3</b>	<b>5' X 18" FRONT BASEMENT WINDOW (1653 MID. ST.)</b>
<b>4</b>	<b>1655 MIDDLETON ST. / REAR OF DWELLING</b>
<b>5</b>	<b>1ST FLOOR STAIRS TO 2ND FLOOR</b>
<b>6</b>	<b>DINING RM. EAST TO LIV. RM. FRONT WINDOW &amp; DOOR</b>
<b>7</b>	<b>DINING RM. WEST TO REAR (FF. CRAIG FOUND HERE #1)</b>
<b>8</b>	<b>DINING RM. INTO LIVING RM. 1-3/4" FOOT PRINT</b>
<b>9</b>	<b>DINING RM. @ KIT. DOOR (FF. CRAIG FOUND HERE #2)</b>
<b>10</b>	<b>DINING RM. INTO KIT. FF. CRAIG LAST CONFIRMED LOC.</b>
<b>11</b>	<b>KITCHEN / BASEMENT DOOR WAY</b>
<b>12</b>	<b>BASEMENT STAIRS UP TO KITCHEN</b>
<b>13</b>	<b>BASEMENT REC RM. GARAGE WALL</b>
<b>14</b>	<b>BASEMENT REC RM. EAST OUT WINDOW</b>
<b>15</b>	<b>BASEMENT HALL WAY FROM REC RM TO REAR DOOR</b>
<b>16</b>	<b>HVAC SHAFT WAY</b>
<b>17</b>	<b>SCBA #4 HARNESS</b>
<b>18</b>	<b>SCBA #4 HARNESS - OPEN</b>
<b>19</b>	<b>SCBA #4 HOLE IN BUDDY BREATHING HOSE</b>
<b>20</b>	<b>SCBA #4 HOLE IN BUDDY BREATHING HOSE - CLOSE</b>
<b>21</b>	<b>SCBA #4 HOLE IN B.B. HOSE - LONG VIEW</b>
<b>22</b>	<b>FF. JOYCE CRAIG'S SCBA MASK</b>



**PHOTO 1**

**1655 Middleton Street and attached row type dwellings on the west side of Middleton Street.**



PHOTO 2

1655 Middleton Street.






**5' x 18" GLASS BLOCK  
WINDOW**

**PHOTO 3**

**Front of 1653 Middleton Street - Bravo Exposure with similar 5' x 18" glass block front basement window.**





**PHOTO 4**

**1655 Middleton Street from rear drive way. (Charlie "C" Division)**



**PHOTO 5**

**Stair way from 1<sup>st</sup> floor to 2<sup>nd</sup> floor – directly in line with front entrance door.**





1-3/4" HOSE LINE FOOT  
PRINT

**PHOTO 6**

Looking east from dining room at entrance into living room.





**FIREFIGHTER JOYCE CRAIG  
FOUND UNRESPONSIVE HERE**

**FIREFIGHTER JOYCE CRAIG'S LAST  
CONFIRMED LOCATION**

**PHOTO 7**

**Looking west from living room at entrance to dining room.**



PHOTO 8

1-3/4" HOSE LINE FOOT PRINT

Dining room looking east into living room.





**PHOTO 9**

**Dining room at kitchen door way.**



PHOTO 10

Dining room looking into kitchen.

DECORATIVE CUT OUTS  
IN KITCHEN / DINING  
ROOM WALLS

FIREFIGHTER JOYCE CRAIG'S  
LAST CONFIRMED LOCATION





**PHOTO 11**

**Kitchen looking into basement door way.**





**PHOTO 12**

**Basement stairs up to kitchen door way.**

REC  
ROOM  
/ HALL  
WAY  
DOOR



PHOTO 13

Basement recreation room – masonry garage wall, and at left – recreation room / hall way door.





**PHOTO 14**

**Basement recreation room east to front window.**



**PHOTO 15**

**Basement hall way from the recreation room to the rear basement entrance door.**





**PHOTO 16**

**Heating Ventilation Air Conditioning (HVAC) shaft way to 2<sup>nd</sup> floor ceiling / roof void space (cockloft).**



**PHOTO 17**

**Firefighter Joyce Craig's Self Contained Breathing Apparatus Harness.**



**PHOTO 18**

**Firefighter Joyce Craig's Self Contained Breathing Apparatus Harness. (Open)**



**PHOTO 19**

**Burn through hole in the low pressure buddy breathing hose on Firefighter Joyce Craig's Self Contained Breathing Apparatus Harness.**





**PHOTO 20**

**Burn through hole in the low pressure buddy breathing hose on Firefighter Joyce Craig's Self Contained Breathing Apparatus Harness. (Close up)**



**PHOTO 21**

**Burn through hole in the low pressure buddy breathing hose on Firefighter Joyce Craig's Self Contained Breathing Apparatus Harness.**




**PHOTO 22**

**Firefighter Joyce Craig's Self Contained Breathing Apparatus Face Mask.**

#### **IV. DIAGRAMS**


##### **DIAGRAM LOG**

<b>DIAGRAM</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
<b>1</b>	<b>1655 MIDDLETON ST. BASEMENT</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>1655 MIDDLETON ST. 1<sup>ST</sup> FLOOR</b>
<b>3</b>	<b>1655 MIDDLETON ST. 2<sup>ND</sup> FLOOR</b>
<b>4</b>	<b>1655 MIDDLETON ST. 1<sup>ST</sup> FL. -OFFICER &amp; TIP FF</b>
<b>5</b>	<b>1655 MIDDLETON ST. 1<sup>ST</sup> FL. -FF. CRAIG, TIP FF. &amp; OFF.</b>
<b>6</b>	<b>1655 MIDDLETON ST. 1<sup>ST</sup> FL. -FF. CRAIG FOUND HERE</b>
<b>7</b>	<b>1655 MIDDLETON ST. AREA MAP #1</b>
<b>8</b>	<b>1655 MIDDLETON ST. AREA MAP #2</b>




**DIAGRAM 1**

**1655 Middleton Street – Basement.**




**DIAGRAM 2**

**1655 Middleton Street 1<sup>st</sup> floor.**



**DIAGRAM 3**  
**1655 Middleton Street 2<sup>nd</sup> floor.**



**DIAGRAM 4**


**1655 Middleton Street 1<sup>st</sup> floor.**

**Time: Approximately 0258 - 0259.**

**#2 - Engine 73 Officer.**

**#3 - Engine 73 Tip Firefighter.**





**DIAGRAM 5**


**1655 Middleton St. 1<sup>st</sup> floor.**

**Time: Approximately 0258 – 0259.**

**#1 - Firefighter Joyce Craig.**

**#2 - Engine 73 Officer.**

**#3 – Engine 73 Tip Firefighter.**




**DIAGRAM 6**

**1655 Middleton Street 1<sup>st</sup> floor.**

**Time: Approximately 0315.**

**#1 - Firefighter Joyce Craig found unresponsive at this location.**





## **V. OPERATIONS**

On Sunday, December 9, 2014 at 0249, the Philadelphia Fire Department's (PFD) Fire Communication Center (FCC) received a telephone alarm reporting a fire in a middle of the row single family dwelling located at 1655 Middleton Street. At 0249, Tactical Box 6542 was transmitted and the following units were dispatched:

Engine Company 73 (1<sup>st</sup> due Engine Company).

Engine Company 63 (2<sup>nd</sup> due Engine Company).

Ladder Company 8 (1<sup>st</sup> due Ladder Company).

Ladder Company 21 (2<sup>nd</sup> due Ladder Company).

Battalion 2

Engine Company 73 was assigned on the initial alarm, as per the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system. The CAD information was as follows:

Dwelling fire. Lady in the living room, the door is open.

On the morning of December 9, 2014, the National Weather Service, at Northeast Philadelphia Airport, reported a temperature of 37 degrees and an average wind speed out of the northeast at 16.3 mph. It was also raining.

Ladder Company 29 would normally have been assigned as the 1<sup>st</sup> due Ladder Company. They were dispatched at 02:47:00 to assist a Medic Unit in gaining access to a patient in a dwelling, who was having breathing difficulties. Therefore, Ladder Company 8 replaced them as 1<sup>st</sup> due. Ladder 29 was recalled by the Medic Unit and made themselves available at 02:57:24.

1655 Middleton Street is a row house dwelling of ordinary construction. The house is 18 feet wide by 35 feet long. The house is located in the middle of the row, with dwellings of the same size and dimensions attached to the north and south sides of the property. There are 34 dwellings, each attached to the other, situated along the west side of Middleton Street. The dwelling sits back 43 feet from the street. It is accessed by using 6 concrete steps that run from the front sidewalk to a walk way bordered on either side by a lawn. This walk way is 20 feet long and leads to 4 front entrance way steps that lead into the 1st floor of the property. (Refer to Photos 1 & 2)

The front, Alpha Division, Middleton Street side of the dwelling is 2 stories high with an entrance door on the north side of the house. There is a picture window on the 1st floor front of the house and 2 side by side thermal pane double hung windows on the 2nd floor front of house.

The house is 3 stories high in the rear with an entrance door and an aluminum one car garage door. This would become the Charlie Division. The rear of the house has a single double hung thermal pane window in the kitchen and side by side double hung thermal pane windows in the dining room. The 2nd floor rear of the property has the same windows in virtually the same locations as the 1st floor. (Refer to photo 4)

The house has 2 main floors and a basement. The upper or 2nd floor has a master bedroom and adjoining bathroom along with 2 more bedrooms and another bathroom. The main or 1st floor has a living room, dining room and kitchen. The 2nd floor is accessed by a stairway located on the north side of the dwelling, directly in line with the front entrance door.

The basement is accessed from the 1st floor via a door way located in the kitchen. The kitchen / basement door way led to a stairway that was also located on the north side of the dwelling and was directly under the stairs to the 2nd floor. The basement has a recreation room located in the east half of the basement and a hall way on the south side of the basement that connected the recreation room to a rear exit, that opened directly to the rear driveway. (Refer to Diagrams 1, 2 & 3)

The hall way contained the gas furnace, washer, dryer, and the electric panel. The basement level of the house also has a one car garage located directly behind the recreation room. The garage is separated from the hallway and recreation room by a masonry wall and did not connect with either of these features.

The exposures of the dwelling are as follows:

Exposure "A" - similar style dwellings on the east side of Middleton Street, approximately 136 feet away.

Exposure "B" - 1653 Middleton Street.

Exposure "C" - across the driveway, approximately 60 feet to the west, are the rear facing properties of similar row house style homes. These homes faced Walton Avenue.

Exposure "D" - 1657 Middleton Street.

The Philadelphia Fire Marshal's Office ruled that the cause of the fire was "Undetermined". The fire started in the basement recreation room, when an unknown ignition source ignited available combustible material. The fire was discovered by the 74 year old female occupant of the house. She was watching television in the 2nd floor front bedroom when the lamp beside her bed began to flicker on and off. The occupant proceeded down the stairs to the 1st floor and discovered that a front exterior light that had been on, was now off. She proceeded to the kitchen / basement door, which was opened slightly, and saw that smoke was venting from the doorway. At this time the 1st floor smoke alarm activated. The occupant then called 911 and reported a fire in her home. She left the basement door open. The occupant proceeded to the front door and awaited the arrival of PFD units with the front door open.

## INITIAL OPERATIONS

Engine 73 arrived in 3 minutes and 44 seconds. The apparatus parked just south of the dwelling. All Engine Companies on the alarm were staffed with an Officer and 3 Firefighters. Upon arrival, the Officer from Engine 73 gave a report on the North Fire Talk Group of “nothing showing”. The North Fire Talk Group operator informed him that someone was supposed to be trapped in the living room. At that point, the North Fire Talk Group operator placed the other incoming companies on “reduced speed”<sup>1</sup>. The Officer from Engine 73 then proceeded to the front door where he was met by the 74 year old, female occupant of the home. She told him that there was a fire in the basement. The Officer instructed the occupant to leave the property. The Officer then proceeded directly to the “wide open” kitchen / basement door. He encountered a light haze of smoke on the 1st floor and “heavy dark brown smoke” in the basement. The Officer did not enter the basement. Unknown to the Officer, the occupant had not left the dwelling, but had returned instead, to the 2nd floor front bedroom to get shoes and additional clothing. At 0254, Battalion 2 had arrived on scene. The Officer from Engine 73 raised Command / Battalion 2 on North Tac 1 (the encrypted talk channel) and notified him that he had a fire in the basement and he was placing 1 and 1 (1st Engine Company and 1st Ladder Company) in service.

Command / Battalion 2, then raised Communications / Battalion 2 Aide and told him they have a 15 X 35 middle of the row, occupied dwelling, with a fire in the basement and ordered him to put 1 and 1 in service. Communications / Battalion 2 Aide, then raised the FCC and issued those orders. The FCC also ordered responding companies to resume emergency speed.

The Officer from Engine 73 did not have his Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) on when he entered the dwelling and he exited the house to put it on. When he exited, he ordered the other three Firefighters from Engine 73 to stretch the four lengths of 1-3/4” hose line from the driver’s side of the apparatus hose bed into the 1st floor. The other 3 Firefighters from Engine 73 were the Driver / Pump Operator, Tip Firefighter (person operating the nozzle) and Firefighter Joyce Craig, who was assigned as Engine 73 Pak.<sup>2</sup> The Tip Firefighter and Firefighter Joyce Craig had donned their SCBA enroute, except for their face masks. Both the Tip Firefighter and Firefighter Joyce Craig were females. Firefighter Joyce Craig was normally assigned to Engine Company 64 but was working overtime at Engine 73. The usual complement of Firefighters assigned to Engine Company 73 was made up of three male Firefighters and one female Firefighter. This would have a bearing on the incident as it unfolded.

While the Officer donned his SCBA, the other 3 Firefighters from Engine 73 stretched the 1-3/4” hose line from the Officer’s side of the apparatus, which gave the company 150’ of hose line to operate with. At the same time that the Firefighters from Engine 73 were beginning to stretch their hose line, Command / Battalion 2 entered the property and said that the conditions were clear enough on the 1st floor that he could see through the property to the rear windows. Command / Battalion 2 proceeded to

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<sup>1</sup> All warning devices turned off.

<sup>2</sup> The Firefighter assigned as the “Pak” is responsible for carrying a “haligan” tool. This is a metal tool used for prying, forcible entry, etc.

the 2nd floor where he encountered the female occupant in the front bedroom. He noticed a 6 inch layer of smoke beneath the 2nd floor ceiling. Fire patterns and this statement indicate that the fire had most likely already extended to, or was extending to the 2nd floor cockloft, via a shaft way created for the Heating Ventilation Air Conditioning (HVAC) ductwork. This shaft way ran from the basement to the cockloft between the 2nd floor ceiling and roof. Command / Battalion 2 then told the occupant to follow him to the exit. Command / Battalion 2 then proceeded back down the stairs to the 1st floor when he realized that the occupant had not followed him. He returned to the 2nd floor and picked the occupant up in his arms. He carried her back down the stairs to the 1st floor entrance and handed her to the Ladder Company 21 Search Firefighter (Ladder 21 arrived at 0258 hours). Command / Battalion 2 stated that he now had light smoke on the 1st floor and it was getting warmer.

While Command / Battalion 2 was locating and removing the occupant, the Firefighters from Engine 73 had advanced their 1-3/4" hose line through the front door and into the dining room. At 0255, Engine 63 had arrived on location and the Officer and two other Firefighters from that company had proceeded to the rear of the dwelling, via the rear driveway. The Officer and Tip Firefighter from Engine 73 were kneeling in the dining room at the wall separating the dining room from the kitchen.

The entrance to the kitchen was in front of them and to their right. They were both facing west. While they were kneeling, they were also donning their SCBA face masks. Firefighter Joyce Craig was on the exterior, flaking out the hose line for service.

At 0256, the Officer from Engine 73 raised the Driver / Pump Operator from Engine 73 and ordered him to "give me the water". The Officer from Engine 73 could see fire beginning to vent from the top of the kitchen / basement door way, through a decorative cutout (a square about 2' x 2') in the dining room / kitchen wall. (Refer to Photo 10) Conditions were deteriorating with heavy smoke conditions throughout the 1st floor. At this time (0257), the Officer from Engine 63 raised Command / Battalion 2 and reported "nothing showing in the rear – negative, I got fire 1st floor kitchen area" after he saw a flash of fire on the 1st floor rear. Engine 63 Officer stated that the smoke conditions changed instantly from light to medium from the 1st and 2nd floor windows. The Firefighters from Engine 63 returned to their apparatus and began to stretch a 3" supply line down the rear driveway, where they would connect it to a 1-3/4" hose line.

By approximately 0257, the Officer from Engine 73 had completed donning his SCBA face mask, protective hood and gloves and began to discharge water through the decorative cutout in the dining room / kitchen wall into the kitchen / basement door way while the Tip Firefighter was still in the process of donning her SCBA face mask. The fire then darkened down. The Tip Firefighter from Engine 73 was now ready with all her personal protective equipment (PPE) in place. She and the Officer from Engine 73 then advanced through the dining room / kitchen door way and into the kitchen. They were approximately 3 or 4 feet from the basement door way. The Officer from Engine 73 stated that there



was a “good amount of heat” in the kitchen. The Officer believed that Firefighter Joyce Craig may have been in the front doorway at this time, helping to advance the hose line. (Refer to Diagram 4)

By 0258, Command / Battalion 2 had exited the dwelling and he then raised Communications / Bn2 Aide and ordered “2 and 2” in service (1st 2 Engine Companies and 1st 2 Ladder Companies). He also ordered to “strike out a box”. This would bring an additional 2 Engine Companies, Rapid Intervention Team Ladder Company, Special Operations Company, and a 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion Chief to the scene. Command / Battalion 2 reported that he had “heavy fire in the basement”. Command / Battalion 2 stated that conditions had deteriorated rapidly after he exited the dwelling. Communications / Battalion 2 Aide stated that both he and Command / Battalion 2 could see fire through the basement glass block window.

While the Firefighters from Engine 73 were donning their SCBA face masks and the Firefighters from Engine 63 were stretching their hose line down the rear drive way, Ladder 21 had arrived on scene at 0258. The Officer from Ladder 21 stated that upon his arrival there was heavy smoke throughout the dwelling. The Officer from Ladder 21 entered the dwelling and proceeded to the 2nd floor to conduct a primary search. He had just vented the front bedroom windows when he saw the Ladder 21 Inside Hook Firefighter raising a 20’ portable ladder to the 2nd floor front windows.

The Ladder 21 Inside Hook Firefighter then “took out” the glass blocks in the 5’ x 18” front basement window. The Driver and Outside Hook Firefighter from Ladder 21 were raising the main ladder<sup>3</sup> to the roof and the Search Firefighter was assisting the occupant from the dwelling.

Again, at 0258, the Officer from Engine 63 raised Command / Battalion 2 and reported he had light to medium smoke on the 1st and 2nd floors in the rear. At approximately 0258 – 0259, the Tip Firefighter from Engine 73 began to have difficulty with her SCBA and exited the kitchen. She followed the hose line into the dining room and encountered Firefighter Joyce Craig. Firefighter Joyce Craig was “on the line” right next to the wall separating the kitchen from the dining room. The Tip Firefighter stated that she brushed against Firefighter Joyce Craig as the Tip Firefighter was crawling east toward the front door. (Refer to Diagram 5) The Officer from Engine 73 began to operate the hose line and stated that he began to discharge water into the basement. The fire darkened down after he opened the nozzle and began to “whip” the hose line around, directly down the basement steps. The Tip Firefighter exited the dwelling without her helmet and proceeded to Engine 73’s apparatus where the Driver / Pump Operator helped her exchange SCBA bottles.

At 0259, Command / Battalion 2 attempted to raise Ladder 8 Officer. At this point Ladder 8 was still the 1st due Ladder Company. They were, however, going to be delayed. Ladder 21 had assumed the 1st due position on the fire ground.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> The main ladder is the 100’ telescoping ladder that is attached to a revolving turntable, that is then attached to the trailer of a 2 piece (tractor and trailer) fire apparatus.

<sup>4</sup> The Fire Communication Center (FCC) has the ability to track Fire Department apparatus through the use of GPS. The routes taken by all responding Engine and Ladder Companies were recorded.

At 02:59:28, Communications / Battalion 2 Aide raised the FCC and ordered that the Box be struck out for this assignment and that “2 and 2” are to be placed in service.

At 02:59:39, Command / Battalion 2 attempted to raise the Officer from Engine 73. Engine 63 Officer reported that he was standing by, in the rear. Command / Battalion 2 ordered him to open the rear. At 0300, the FCC dispatched the balance of Box 6542:

Engine Company 51 (3<sup>rd</sup> due Engine Company)

Engine Company 19 (4<sup>th</sup> due Engine Company)

Rapid Intervention Team (RIT) Ladder Company 29 (Ladder 29 had become available from a prior medical assignment)

Special Operations Company Squad 72

Battalion 9 (2<sup>nd</sup> due Battalion Chief)

Also at 0300, Command / Battalion 2 raised the Officer from Ladder 8 and told him that he “has to get this place opened up”. At 0301, Engine 63 Officer notified Command / Battalion 2 that Engine 63 was able to get into the basement from the rear driveway. The basement door was now open on the west end of the basement. The basement glass block window was now out on the east end of the basement, the basement door was open and the front door was open. Engine 63 Tip Firefighter stated that there was now heavy fire in the basement recreation room – floor to ceiling, and the basement hall way leading from the rear door to the recreation room had very little heat.

The Officer from Engine 73 began to call to Firefighter Joyce Craig for more line and for help pulling the hose line. He stated that he could hear someone moving on the other side of the dining room / kitchen wall, and he did get more hose line to work with, as he moved to about 2’ from the basement door way.

At approximately 0302, heavy fire was now venting from the basement window with heavy smoke conditions throughout the dwelling. Command / Battalion 2 attempted to raise Engine 73 Officer twice. At 03:02:15, Command / Battalion 2 ordered Engine 73 to back their line out. During this time, the Officer from Engine 73 stated that a “fire ball” that covered the top half of the basement door way came up the basement steps and into the kitchen. This fire ball knocked him back onto his left side. He rolled back onto his hands and knees and located the hose line. He stated that he had zero visibility and high heat. The Officer stated that he knew it was time to get out of the dwelling and he followed the hose line out of the kitchen, through the dining room, and through the living room. He did not hear anyone in the dining room or kitchen, and he thought that the Tip Firefighter and Firefighter Joyce Craig were out of the dwelling.

At 03:02:36, the Officer from Ladder 21, who was still on the 2nd floor, notified Command / Battalion 2 that the primary search was negative. **The Officer from Engine 73 had now exited the dwelling and was on the front steps of the property when, at 03:02:45, Firefighter Joyce Craig issued her 1st Mayday**

**message “Mayday Engine 63 Pak trapped on the 1st floor”. At the same time, the FCC on the North Fire Talk Group raised Communications / Battalion 2 Aide and notified him that the FCC was receiving an emergency activation from Engine 73 Pak radio on North Tac 1.<sup>5</sup>**

At approximately 0303, Command / Battalion 2 ordered the Officer from Engine 73, the Search Firefighter and Inside Hook Firefighter from Ladder 21 to enter the dwelling and search for Engine 73 Pak. At this time, Battalion 2 Aide / Communications exited his vehicle and went directly to Command / Battalion 2 to make sure that he heard the Mayday, and he had already heard it.

**At 03:03:06, Firefighter Joyce Craig transmitted “Engine 73”. At 03:03:16, Firefighter Joyce Craig transmitted that “I am trapped on the 1st floor, Engine 73 Pak”** The FCC on the North Fire Talk Group attempted to raise Communications / Battalion 2 Aide 3 times (03:03:20, 03:03:27, 03:03:33). **At 03:03:26, Firefighter Joyce Craig transmitted “Engine 73, Pak, I’m trapped”** At 03:03:23, Engine 63 Officer radioed his Driver / Pump Operator to send the water. At 03:03:35, the Officer of Ladder 8 notified the FCC that Ladder 8 was stuck behind some cars (they will be delayed). **At 03:03:51, Firefighter Joyce Craig transmitted “Engine 73 Pak (unreadable)”.**

At this point, the following units all heard one of the Mayday transmissions, or a transmission that indicated to them, that a firefighter was trapped and this was a real emergency:

The Officers from Engine 19, Engine 51, Squad 72, Ladder 8, Battalion 9, and Battalion 9 Aide.

The Officer from Engine 63 and the Officer from Ladder 29 did not hear a Mayday transmission.

At 03:03:55, the FCC raised Ladder 29 Officer and changed his assignment from the Rapid Intervention Team to the 2nd due Ladder Company. The FCC also assigned Ladder 8 as the Rapid Intervention Team. Twelve seconds later, the FCC raised Communications / Battalion 2 Aide to inform him that they were receiving an emergency activation from Engine 73 Pak, and they are saying they are trapped in the basement. Command / Battalion 2 attempted to raise Ladder 8 Officer. Command / Battalion 2 still did not know that Ladder 8 had been delayed and that their assignment had been changed to the Rapid Intervention Team.

After giving the report that the primary search was negative, the Officer of Ladder 21 remained on the 2nd floor. Nine seconds later, Firefighter Joyce Craig issued her 1st Mayday, and the Officer from Engine 73 had exited the dwelling after a “ fireball “ came up the basement stairs. There was now heavy smoke throughout the dwelling and heavy fire venting “like a jet engine” from the basement window. The Officer from Ladder 21 stated that he was met with a tremendous amount of heat from above and below him, or a “heat sandwich”, unlike anything he had encountered in 22 years of service with the

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<sup>5</sup> All Philadelphia Fire Department portable radios are equipped with an Emergency Button. Depressing the Emergency Button initiates several alarms. Audio and visual alarms activate at the Fire Commissioner Center and on all portable radios operating on that Talk Group. Additionally, the initiating portable radio has a 10 second open microphone.

PFD. The Officer from Ladder 21 stated that the heat was so intense, that he thought if he did not exit the dwelling immediately, he would not survive. The Officer from Ladder 21 stated that he dropped to his stomach and crawled down the 1st floor steps and out the front door. In his haste to exit the dwelling, the Officer emerged on the front steps without his helmet and flashlight. The Officer from Ladder 21 also could see an orange glow in the dining room as he exited, and he could hear someone yelling for help. He was seen coming out of the house by the Officer from Engine 51. This occurred at approximately 03:04:30 – 0305. During this same time frame, Communications / Battalion 2 Aide again exited his vehicle to notify Command / Battalion 2 that the FCC was still receiving an emergency activation from Engine 73 Pak.

Meanwhile, the Officer from Engine 73, the Search Firefighter and Inside Hook Firefighter from Ladder 21 were on the 1st floor searching for Firefighter Joyce Craig. The Inside Hook Firefighter from Ladder 21 had entered the dwelling and began to follow the hose line. The Search Firefighter was on his left foot<sup>6</sup> and they searched together. The Search Firefighter from Ladder 21 was using the Thermal Imaging Camera (TIC) to locate Firefighter Joyce Craig. He stated that he had “heat signatures everywhere”<sup>7</sup> and he could not locate her.

Both Firefighters from Ladder 21 could hear Firefighter Joyce Craig calling for help. They were calling back to her and trying to locate her. The Inside Hook Firefighter from Ladder 21 stated that the hose line made a left turn and looped back over itself at the area between the living and dining rooms. The Investigative Team believes that photographic evidence suggests that the hose line never left the dining room / kitchen area. (See Photo 8)

He stated that he and the Search Firefighter got to the point of the dining room / kitchen doorway and could see heavy fire venting out of the kitchen / basement doorway, across the kitchen ceiling, and back down the rear kitchen wall. He stated that the fire was getting behind them. The Officer from Engine 73 was also searching at this time, as well, although he was not with the Firefighters from Ladder 21. At 03:04:56, Battalion 9 arrived on location and had driven directly to the rear of the dwelling, via the rear driveway. At this point, Engine 63 Officer was asking for more pressure in their 3” hose line. They had not yet entered the basement with a charged hose line.

The Officer from Engine 51 and his Firefighters were already bringing the 1-3/4” hose line to the front of the dwelling when they received orders from Communications / Battalion 2 Aide to do so at 03:04:56. At approximately 0305, Ladder 29 drove their apparatus to the entrance of the rear driveway on the north end of Middleton Street; after stopping momentarily in front of the fire dwelling to allow the Driver /

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<sup>6</sup> Refers to a search technique in which Firefighters remain in contact with each other. One Firefighter while crawling will lead the search team and the other Firefighter will follow and remain in contact with the lead Firefighters left or right foot.

<sup>7</sup> The Search Firefighter from Ladder 21 was using a Thermal Imaging Camera, or TIC. This camera is capable of displaying an image through zero visibility smoke conditions. It operates by detecting an object’s residual heat (heat signature) and then displaying that object’s image in the view finder.

Pump Operator and Tip Firefighter from Engine 73 to move out of the way (the Driver/ Pump Operator was swapping out the Tip Firefighter's SCBA bottle). At 03:05:08, the FCC notified Communications / Battalion 2 Aide that Ladder 8 was now the RIT and Ladder 29 would be 2nd due. **At 03:05:11, Firefighter Joyce Craig keyed her radio, but her transmission was unreadable.** At 03:05:11, Command / Battalion 2 attempted to raise Ladder 8 Officer. At 03:05:38, Communications / Battalion 2 Aide raised Command / Battalion 2 and notified him that he " has Ladder 29 and Ladder 8 out here".

**At 03:06:06, Firefighter Joyce Craig made her last Mayday transmission: "Engine 73 can't breathe, I can't breathe. Engine73 Pak"**

At 03:06:20, Command / Battalion 2, raised the Officer from Engine 73 and asked him if he had any luck. The Officer replied: "Negative, still searching".

0306 – 0307. Fire conditions, at this point, are floor to ceiling fire in the basement recreation room. Fire is venting, possibly 10', from the front basement window. The kitchen was heavily involved in fire; the fire was extending into the dining room and had already extended into the cockloft. There were heavy smoke conditions throughout the dwelling. The rear basement exit door is open and the rear windows are still intact.

At 03:06:46, Charlie Division / Battalion 9 raised Command / Battalion 2 and reported that Engine 63 had a line, and that they have a shot to the basement. He reported heavy smoke conditions on all floors. Engine 63 can advance if you (Command) don't have anybody in there. Command / Battalion 2 informed Charlie Division / Battalion 9 that he has "a search party on the 1st floor and that we have a member down on the 1st floor, and we are in there trying to get her". Charlie Division / Battalion 9 reported that "Engine 63 is advancing and that they have water on the fire".

At 03:07:22, the FCC raised Communications / Battalion 2 Aide and asked if he had any information on the emergency activation. At 03:07:51, Emergency Medical Services Officer 10 (ES10) ordered FCC to dispatch a 2nd Medic Unit to the incident scene.

At 0307 – 0308, the Search Firefighter from Ladder 21 had his low air alarm activate and he, and the Inside Hook Firefighter from Ladder 21, exited the property. The Officer from Engine 73 remained inside. At 03:07:57, Command / Battalion 2 raised the Officer from Engine 73 and asked him "How are you making out with your person?" The Officer responded "Still negative, sir" and notified Command / Battalion 2 that they need a hose line on the 1st floor. The fire has now extended beyond the kitchen and dining room, and into the living room. There was also heavy fire in the 2nd floor cockloft, and it was venting out of the 2nd floor bathroom skylight.

Around 0308, the Tip Firefighter from Engine 73 had reentered the dwelling and remained at the base of the stairs to the 2nd floor. The Tip Firefighter from Engine 73 was experiencing extreme heat. At 03:08:12, Communications / Battalion 2 Aide asked FCC if Ladder 8 was on the fireground. FCC responded "OK". At 03:08:28, FCC attempted to raise Communications / Battalion 2 Aide on North Tac-1.

At 03:08:37 FCC raised Communications / Battalion 2 Aide to inform him that there is an emergency activation from Squad 72 Officer's radio and that he is still waiting on a report on Engine 73's Pak radio. At 03:08:56, Communications / Battalion 2 Aide raised Command / Battalion 2 and asked him if he was putting the Rapid Intervention Team (RIT) in service.

At 03:09:27, Charlie Division / Battalion 9 reported that Engine 63 was advancing on the fire in the basement and heavy smoke conditions existed on all floors. Engine 51 was now in front of the fire dwelling and had connected their 1-3/4" hose line to Engine 73's apparatus. The Officer from Engine 51 heard Command / Battalion 2 say that a Firefighter was still missing.

The Officer and 2 Firefighters from Squad 72 were now, also present, and in front of the fire dwelling. The Officer from Squad 72 stated that Command / Battalion 2 ordered him to help put out the fire. There was now water on the fire in the basement and heavy smoke was venting from the basement window. There was now fire throughout the 1st floor.

At this time, the Officer from Engine 73 encountered the Engine 73 Tip Firefighter as the Officer was exiting the dwelling. When the Tip Firefighter encountered the Officer, she asked him if he was "Joyce". He responded no, it's me. The Tip Firefighter and the Officer from Engine 73 then stated that the Officer exited the dwelling first. The Tip Firefighter from Engine 73 stated that she could hear Firefighter Joyce Craig's PASS Device alarming. Squad 72 Officer reported that he saw both the Officer and the Tip Firefighter from Engine 73 exit. The Officer from Engine 73 exited first. The Officer from Engine 51 stated that he encountered the Tip Firefighter from Engine 73 in the vestibule, as she was exiting. The Tip Firefighter from Engine 73 stated that she was attempting to exit and encountered other responding Firefighters entering the vestibule. As she exited the dwelling, Engine 51 Officer called out to the other responding Firefighters and Officers that "We got her". The Officer from Engine 73 also approached her on the exterior and mistook the Tip Firefighter from Engine 73 for Firefighter Joyce Craig – until she spoke, and he then realized that she was not Firefighter Joyce Craig.

The Officer from Engine 73 stated that the consensus at the exterior front of the dwelling was that the Tip Firefighter from Engine 73 was indeed Firefighter Joyce Craig. Communications / Battalion 2 Aide approached her and told her to reset her radio from emergency alert status. The Tip Firefighter stated that she then informed Communications / Battalion 2 Aide that "It's not my emergency button – it's Joyce's".

This led to confusion in front of the dwelling. Most Firefighters present knew that a female Firefighter was missing. This was the first night in Battalion 2 for the newly assigned Incident Commander / Battalion 2. He knew he had a female Firefighter assigned to Engine 73, but he did not realize that another female Firefighter had been hired to work overtime. So, when the Officer from Engine 51 called out that "We got her", Command / Battalion 2, as well as the other Officers and Firefighters present in front of the dwelling, thought that the missing Firefighter had been located.



The result of this confusion:

At 03:09:50, Communications / Battalion 2 Aide raised Command / Battalion 2 to ask him if the emergency for Engine 73 Pak had been cleared. Command / Battalion 2 stated "That's affirmative, reset and unfounded".

Command / Battalion 2, the Officers from Engine 51 and Squad 72 quickly realized their misidentification, recovered, and began to advance into the 1st floor of the dwelling, behind the hose line of Engine 51. The Officer from Squad 72 stated that fire was now venting from the 1st floor front window. Multiple Firefighters and Officers stated that there was heavy fire in the living room. There was heavy fire venting from the 2nd floor bathroom skylight.

At 03:10:40, Charlie Division / Battalion 9 reported that the bulk of the fire had been knocked down in the basement and that Ladder 29 was ventilating the rear. By this time, Ladder 29 had raised portable ladders to the kitchen / dining room windows and the 2nd floor bedroom windows. Engine 19 had also been ordered to take a 1-3/4" hose line to the Bravo Exposure (1657 Middleton Street).

0311 to 0315. The Officer from Squad 72 stated that he attempted to pull Engine 73's hose line to him, prior to advancing into the dwelling, and that "It felt like something was on it". Engine 51 and Squad 72 now began advancing through the 1st floor with the hose line from Engine 51, extinguishing fire as they went. The Officer from Engine 73 was with them. At 0311, Ladder 8 arrived on the fireground. Communications / Battalion 2 Aide reported to the FCC that the bulk of the fire had been knocked down in the basement, but he still had heavy fire on the 1st and 2nd floors. At 0312, Communications / Battalion 2 Aide ordered Medic 16 to the front of the fire dwelling.

Companies were continuing to knock down fire as they advanced. At 03:13:44, Command / Battalion 2 raised Charlie Division / Battalion 9 and ordered him to check the basement to make sure that no one was down there. Charlie Division / Battalion 9 acknowledged and stated that Companies were overhauling now. At this time, the fire was being extinguished on the 1st floor, but there was still heavy fire in the 2nd floor cockloft.

At approximately 0314, the Officer and Firefighters from Ladder 8 entered the dwelling. By this time, the bulk of the fire had been extinguished on the 1st floor, and conditions had improved significantly. At approximately 0315, the Search Firefighter from Ladder 29 had entered the dining room through the dining room window, via a portable ladder. The Officer from Ladder 8 stated that, at this time, he was able to stand and remove his face mask.

During this same time frame, Squad 72 Officer stated that he had followed the hose line from Engine 73. As he did so, he encountered an office style chair lying on top of the hose line. He moved the chair and followed the hose line straight through the dining room. He then saw Firefighter Joyce Craig sitting / slumped over on her right side and leaning against a buffet style piece of furniture, under the dining room windows. The 1-3/4" hose line from Engine 73 was right beside her (on her left side) and her left

hand was next to the nozzle. He stated that Firefighter Joyce Craig's left leg was over the hose line, as well. The Search Firefighter from Ladder 29 was standing to her right. At the time, the Officer from Squad 72 thought that they were together. The Officer from Squad 72 then went over to Firefighter Craig and checked on her. He realized, immediately, that she was in trouble. (See Photos 7, 9 and Diagram 6)

The Officer from Squad 72 then removed the regulator from Firefighter Joyce Craig's face mask and noticed that no air was escaping from the regulator, and that her Personal Alert Safety System (PASS) was not activating. Several Officers and Firefighters then reached Firefighter Joyce Craig, at virtually the same time.

At 03:15:21, the Officer from Squad 72 raised Command / Battalion 2 and reported that he had a man down and they were bringing "Him" out. Command / Battalion 2 acknowledged that message. The Firefighters from Squad 72, Ladder 29 and Ladder 8 were all involved in carrying Firefighter Joyce Craig from the dwelling.

None of the Firefighters involved in locating and removing Firefighter Joyce Craig reported hearing a PASS Device alarm during the search for her.

At approximately 0316, Firefighter Joyce Craig was placed on a Reeves Stretcher from Medic 16. This was done on the walkway that leads from the sidewalk steps to the steps into the dwelling. Her SCBA was removed. Her helmet was already off and stuck to Velcro on her bunker coat. She was not wearing her gloves. Firefighter Joyce Craig was placed on the stretcher on the sidewalk. She was not breathing and did not have a pulse. CPR was initiated, as she was moved by many of the Officers and Firefighters who were present, to Medic 16. A Paramedic from Medic 29 joined the Paramedic from Medic 16 in the patient compartment and assisted with the effort to save Firefighter Joyce Craig.

At 03:17:06, the FCC raised Communications / Battalion 2 Aide to inform him that the FCC was receiving an emergency activation from Engine 73 Pak radio over the PHL Band<sup>8</sup>. This accidental emergency activation was due to Advanced Life Support operations in the back of Medic 16. At 0333, Medic 16 was enroute to Einstein Hospital's Emergency Room. A Firefighter was driving and two Paramedics were treating Firefighter Joyce Craig.

After Firefighter Joyce Craig was moved to Medic 16 and then transported to Einstein Hospital, the effort to fight the fire continued and all hands remained in service. The fire was declared under control by Command / Battalion 2 at 03:31:50.

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<sup>8</sup> Philadelphia Fire Department Airport Operational Talk Group.

## **VI. FINDINGS**

- 1.** The Investigation Team was able to account for Firefighter Joyce Craig's location from when she entered the fire dwelling at approximately 02:56 until approximately 03:00; when Engine 73 Tip Firefighter exited the kitchen and encountered Firefighter Joyce Craig next to the wall separating the dining room and kitchen. Firefighter Joyce Craig issued seven Mayday transmissions.<sup>1</sup>

- 03:02:45 Mayday, Engine 63 Pak trapped on 1st floor, Emergency Button Activation.
- 03:03:06 Engine 73, Depressed Push To Talk (PTT) Button with no audio.
- 03:03:16 I am trapped on the 1st floor (unreadable), Engine 73 Pak (PTT).
- 03:03:26 Engine 73 Pak, I am trapped (PTT).
- 03:03:51 Engine 73 Pak unreadable (PTT).
- 03:05:11 Engine 73 Pak unreadable (PTT).
- 03:06:06 Engine 73 Pak,(hard to understand) Engine73 can't breathe, I can't breathe E73 Pak (PTT).

The Investigation Team was unable to account for Firefighter Joyce Craig's exact location from approximately 03:00 until 03:15:21, when Firefighter Joyce Craig was found unconscious in the 1st floor dining room.

When Firefighter Joyce Craig was located:

- Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) face mask was on her face with regulator connected.
- Helmet was on her head.
- Protective hood was partially deployed.<sup>2</sup>
- Gloves were not on her hands.
- SCBA cylinder was depleted.
- Bunker coat, pants and boots were in place.
- Personal Alert Safety System (PASS) Device was not activating.

The Investigation revealed that Firefighter Joyce Craig initially remained near the front entrance, in order to assist in flaking out the 1-3/4" hose line. Firefighter Joyce Craig then entered the fire dwelling after Engine 73 Officer and Engine 73 Tip Firefighter, who were advancing the 1 3/4" hose line toward the 1st floor kitchen / basement door. By approximately 0257 – 0258, Firefighter Joyce Craig had moved to the wall separating the dining room from the kitchen, east of the kitchen entrance. Firefighter Joyce Craig's last known location was at this wall. Shortly after Engine 73 Tip Firefighter encountered her at this location, fire conditions expanded rapidly. Fire quickly spread from the basement to the kitchen, and eventually throughout the 1st floor. Firefighter Joyce Craig remained trapped by these conditions after Engine 73 Tip Firefighter and Engine 73 Officer exited the fire dwelling. Firefighter Joyce Craig remained trapped in the 1st floor dining room of the fire dwelling until her SCBA air depleted, due to the

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<sup>1</sup> Refer to Philadelphia Fire Communication Center Radio Transmission Time Line.

<sup>2</sup> Revealed by examination at NIOSH laboratory.

low pressure buddy breathing hose being burnt through, and she lost consciousness.<sup>3</sup> (See Photos 17 through 21)

- 2.** SCBA #73-4, worn by Firefighter Joyce Craig was impounded by the Fire Marshal's Office at the scene. The SCBA was a Scott AirPak 4.5 positive breathing apparatus with a 45 minute cylinder. The face mask was her assigned Scott AV3000HT. A preliminary visual inspection of this SCBA at the Fire Marshal's Office revealed that skin tissue from Firefighter Joyce Craig's right hand was wedged in the cylinder valve housing of the SCBA. This tissue was collected by investigators from the Fire Marshal's Office and transported to the Medical Examiner's Office.<sup>4</sup>

On December 23, 2014, skin tissue from Firefighter Joyce Craig's left hand was discovered within fire debris at the base of the steps, leading into the dwelling. This tissue was also, sent to the Medical Examiner's Office. Further examination of the SCBA by the Investigation Team revealed that the low pressure buddy breathing hose was burnt through. NIOSH investigators on scene identified the same burn through in the low pressure buddy breathing hose.

NIOSH investigators assumed possession of SCBA #73-4 and had it shipped to their National Personal Protection Lab, 626 Couhrannsmill Road, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for testing on January 09, 2015. The Investigation Team of D.C. Harry J. Bannan, Fire Marshal's Office and D.C. Ted Mueller, Safety Office along with Vice President, Local 22, Edward Marks, were present to witness all testing. SCBA #73-1, #73-2 and SCBA #73-3 were also tested, at this time. Firefighter Joyce Craig's assigned SCBA #73-4 would not maintain pressure during testing, due to the burn through hole in the low pressure buddy breathing hose. The low pressure buddy breathing hose was removed and plugged, and all subsequent tests were performed. SCBA #73-4 passed all testing. SCBA #73-1, #73-2, and SCBA #73-3 also passed testing. The investigation revealed that the low pressure buddy breathing hose burnt through while Firefighter Joyce Craig was operating inside the fire dwelling. This determination is based on the fact that the 45 minute SCBA air supply only lasted for approximately 10 minutes. The 10 minute duration is estimated from the time Firefighter Joyce Craig entered the dwelling and her final Mayday transmission, stating that she can't breathe. The Investigation Team cannot confirm that SCBA #73-4 was inspected by Firefighter Joyce Craig prior to the response.<sup>5</sup> The investigation cannot confirm that Firefighter Joyce Craig had both of her firefighting gloves with her at the time of the fire. One "Shelby", medium size, left hand glove was recovered from the 1st floor dining room. (Refer to Diagram 6) This glove is believed to have belonged to Firefighter Joyce Craig. An extensive search was conducted for the right hand mate of this glove. It was never located. Firefighter Joyce Craig's bunker coat, bunker pants, helmet, firefighting boots, protective hood, and glove were also evaluated by the Investigation Team, and sent to NIOSH for evaluation. Initial evaluation revealed only minimal degradation to the bunker coat and pants. They were not considered a factor in Firefighter Joyce Craig's cause of death.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Refer to NIOSH Report on Self Contained Breathing Apparatus. (Task #20003)

<sup>4</sup> Refer to Medical Examiner Office Reports.

<sup>5</sup> Refer to Engine 73's Self Contained Breathing Apparatus Monthly Check List.

<sup>6</sup> Observation by investigation Team at NIOSH laboratory.



3. Firefighters from Engine 51, Squad 72, Ladder 08, Ladder 21, and Engine 73 Officer did not recall hearing an activated PASS Device alarm at the time that Firefighter Joyce Craig was found. Engine 73 Tip Firefighter stated that she heard an activated PASS Device alarm when she returned to the fire dwelling, at approximately 0308-0309. A review of all fire ground radio transmission tapes does not indicate a PASS alarm activation in the background. Firefighter Joyce Craig's PASS alarm from SCBA #73-4 performed as required during testing at the NIOSH lab.
4. The 1<sup>st</sup> due Ladder Company had a delayed response. They were dispatched at 02:49:59. At 03:03:35, the Officer notified the Fire Communication Center (FCC) that they were stuck behind some cars. He requested that Command / Battalion 2 be notified. They arrived on location at 03:11:00. Total response time was 21 minutes and 1 second.<sup>7</sup>
5. Radio communications on North Tac 1, (encrypted) at the scene did not give a clear and concise picture of conditions:
- There is no evidence to indicate that there was an attempt to contact Firefighter Joyce Craig via portable radio, after her Mayday transmissions.
  - The basement door in the kitchen remained open while there was no active suppression effort. This allowed the fire to spread quickly into the 1st floor.
  - There is an indication that the integrity of Engine 73's team of an Officer and 2 Firefighters operating on the 1st floor had been compromised due to the Tip Firefighter exiting the dwelling with a reported SCBA problem.
  - Command / Battalion 2 was not informed that conditions prohibited Engine 73 from advancing into the basement.
  - Engine 73 Firefighters entered an Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH) atmosphere without properly deployed Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).
  - Engine 73 Officer was not able to acknowledge Command / Battalion 2 when ordered to exit the fire dwelling at 03:02:15.
  - Although multiple Firefighters heard (not over the radio) Firefighter Joyce Craig on the 1st floor, Command / Battalion 2 was not notified.
  - Command / Battalion 2 was not notified of multiple Ladder Company assignment changes.
  - A Ladder Company's delayed response was not communicated to Command / Battalion 2 in a timely manner.
  - There was no coordinated effort to address Firefighter Joyce Craig's Mayday transmissions.
6. There were delays and confusion in accounting for members of Engine 73 operating on the 1st floor of the fire dwelling. Engine 73 Tip Firefighter exited the fire dwelling with a reported SCBA problem at approximately 02:59, and then returned at approximately 03:08, without notifying Engine 73 Officer of her return. Engine 73 Tip Firefighter then exited at approximately 03:09, following Engine 73 Officer out the front door. Engine 73 Officer was searching for Firefighter Joyce Craig and was unaware that Engine

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<sup>7</sup> Refer to GPS printout of the initially assigned 1<sup>st</sup> due Ladder Company.

73 Tip Firefighter had returned to the fire dwelling. Engine 73 Tip Firefighter was mistakenly identified as Firefighter Joyce Craig, when she exited the fire dwelling the 2nd time. This resulted in an inaccurate report from Command / Battalion 2 at 03:09:50, that the Mayday was cleared. Accountability was lost once the functional duties of Engine 73's team were not maintained. An assumption was then made that both of Engine 73's Firefighters had exited the dwelling prior to Engine 73's Officer.

- 7.** Ventilation procedures were not coordinated to augment tactical objectives. The investigation revealed that at 02:58:12, Command / Battalion 2 thought that the Firefighters from Engine 73 were operating a hose line in the basement and "getting water on the fire". The Firefighters from Engine 73 were never able to advance their hose line into the basement. At approximately 0259, the Firefighters from Ladder 21 ventilated the basement, 1st and 2nd floor front windows. At 0302, the Firefighters from Engine 63 made forcible entry into the rear basement / driveway door. This increased fire temperature and spread. As a result of these actions, Engine 73 Officer and Ladder 21 Officer were forced to evacuate. Firefighter Joyce Craig then became trapped, due to these same conditions. An effective hose line was not in place to address the seat of the fire in the basement until 03:06:46, when Engine 63 began extinguishment from Division "C".
- 8.** The investigation revealed that Firefighter Joyce Craig declared a Mayday with required information. First Mayday transmission at 03:02:45 stated "Engine 63 Pak, trapped on 1st floor" (Firefighter Joyce Craig identified herself as Engine 63, not Engine 73).

Engine 73 Officer had exited the fire dwelling at this time, where he was met by Command / Battalion 2. Command / Battalion 2 then ordered (face to face) Engine 73 Officer, Ladder 21 Search Firefighter, and Ladder 21 Inside Hook Firefighter to search for the Firefighter who had issued the Mayday. At 03:03:16, Engine 73 Pak (Firefighter Joyce Craig) stated she was trapped on the 1st floor and at 03:03:26, that Engine 73 Pak is trapped. FCC was continually contacting Communications / Battalion 2 Aide, to notify him of Engine 73 Pak's emergency activation. Engine 73 Pak activated her radio at 03:05:11, but was unreadable. At 03:06:06, Engine 73 Pak transmitted that she can't breathe. Command contacted Engine 73 Officer at 03:06:20 to check on the progress of the search. Engine 73 Officer replied negative. Additional companies were now arriving on the fire ground. Command / Battalion 2 had upgraded the assignment at 02:58:12, prior to the 1st Mayday. Command / Battalion 2 contacted Engine 73 Officer at 03:07:57, to again check on the progress of the search. Engine 73 Officer replied negative, and he needed a line on the 1st floor. By approximately 03:09, all the Firefighters that were initially searching for Firefighter Joyce Craig had exited the dwelling. When Engine 73 Tip Firefighter exited the dwelling, the Officer from Engine 51 mistook her for Firefighter Joyce Craig. Engine 51 Officer called out to the other Firefighters from his Company and the Firefighters from Squad 72 that "we got her". When this occurred, the Firefighters from Engine 51 were preparing to advance a 1-3/4" hose line into the 1st floor of the dwelling. The mistake was quickly realized and Command / Battalion 2 ordered Engine 51 and Squad 72 to extinguish the fire on the 1st floor, and continue to search for the missing Firefighter. The Investigation Team identified key factors that affected Mayday operations:

- Contact was not established with the Firefighter declaring a Mayday.

- No Rapid Intervention Team (RIT) was available on the fireground.
- The Firefighter declaring a Mayday was not operating in complete Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). The member was not wearing firefighting gloves and the protective hood was partially deployed.
- Accountability was not established via a Personnel Accountability Report (PAR).
- The Mayday was not announced to Firefighters on the fireground or to incoming units.
- Incoming companies did not have specific orders to facilitate the rescue effort.
- Poor communications hindered initial rescue operations.
- Available resources were not utilized to augment the initial rescue effort.
- A formal fireground command structure was not established that would effectively support a rescue effort.

9. The Investigation Team was able to account for actions that followed all Philadelphia Fire Department (PFD) operational and training procedures:

- Engine 73 Officer placed himself, his Firefighters and a charged 1¾" hoseline between the fire in the basement and the occupant living space on the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2nd floors; thus protecting any trapped occupants.
- Command/Battalion 2 upgraded the assignment at 02:58:12, as conditions deteriorated, prior to the Mayday transmission.
- Command/Battalion 2 recognized that conditions were deteriorating and ordered Engine 73 Officer to back Engine 73's hose line out of the fire dwelling at 03:02:15, prior to the Mayday.
- Command/Battalion 2 initiated a search at approximately 03:03, for Firefighter Joyce Craig, immediately after she declared a Mayday transmission, at 03:02:45.
- Engine 63, the 2nd due Engine, established water supply to the rear of dwelling to attack the seat of fire, at ground level.
- Ladder 21, the 2nd due Ladder, assumed 1st due responsibilities when the 1st due ladder was delayed.
- Engine 73 Driver/ Pump Operator established a water supply and delivered appropriate water pressure throughout the entire event (this was his 1st significant fire while driving the apparatus).
- Engine 73 Officer, Ladder 21 Search, and Ladder 21 Inside Hook, on orders of Command / Battalion 2, performed an immediate search for Firefighter Joyce Craig under extreme heat, smoke, and fire conditions.
- The knowledge and experience of senior Fire Communications Center supervisors played a critical role in managing this Mayday incident. Senior supervisors at the FCC realized immediately that the north TAC channel / talk group needed to be monitored continuously during this incident and accomplished this without dedicated staff to do so.
- Communications / Battalion 2 aide maintained communications between the Fire Communications Center, the incident commander and companies operating on the incident scene during a high stress and high risk environment.

## **VII. CAUSES**

### **DIRECT CAUSE**

The low pressure buddy breather hose was burnt through on Firefighter Joyce Craig's Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA)<sup>1</sup>. This caused a loss of Firefighter Joyce Craig's air supply, which led to Firefighter Joyce Craig running out of air in an Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH) environment.

### **INDIRECT CAUSES**

- Lack of situational awareness.
- On scene communications were inadequate.
- Poor strategy and tactics.
- Personal Protective Equipment, gloves not on, protective hood partially deployed.<sup>2</sup>
- Absence of a Personnel Accountability System.
- The fire flow path was not controlled.
- Uncoordinated rescue effort.
- Reduced training opportunities for members of the department due to the permanent de-commissioning of 5 engine and 2 ladder companies on January 5, 2009 and the daily de-commissioning of 2 PFD companies per shift known as the "Rolling Brown Out Policy", General Memorandum 10-87, beginning on August 2, 2010.

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<sup>1</sup>Refer to NIOSH Report on Self Contained Breathing Apparatus. (Task #20003)

<sup>2</sup>Observation of the hood by the Investigative Team at the NIOSH laboratory.



## **VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS**

- 1.** The Philadelphia Fire Department (PFD) should upgrade their current Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA), in order to be in compliance with the 2013 edition of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard # 1981. The PFD has already made this upgrade from the Scott AirPak 4.5 (2007 Standard) model to the Scott X3 5.5 (2013 Standard) model.
- 2.** Proper deployment of all Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), prior to entering an Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH) atmosphere, must be enforced (Op.#37).<sup>1</sup>
- 3.** Continued testing on Personal Alert Safety Systems (PASS). National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) testing of Firefighter Joyce Craig's SCBA indicated the PASS Device was operational. Interviews with the Firefighters present, in locating and removing Firefighter Joyce Craig, revealed that none of these Firefighters recalled hearing a PASS Device alarm activation when Firefighter Joyce Craig was located, motionless. Reviews of audio revealed that a PASS Device alarm could not be heard and no Firefighter reported deactivating her PASS Device.
- 4.** Evaluation of the Philadelphia Fire Department's current Mobile Data Terminal's ability to assist drivers, via Global Positioning System (GPS).
- 5.** Development of a Philadelphia Fire Department Operational Procedure for basement fires.
- 6.** (A) Development of a Mayday Operational Procedure and training for all Firefighters. The procedure should have applicable rules and performance standards, on when and how a Firefighter should declare a "Mayday"; and for how an Incident Commander should manage a Mayday incident.
  - LUNAR- acronym for location, unit assigned, name, assistance needed and resources needed.
  - Only emergency radio traffic broadcasted.
  - Personal Accountability Reports (PAR) conducted.
  - Survival techniques.
  - Incident Command tactical Mayday check list.
  - Automatic upgrade of assignment from Fire Communication Center (FCC), once Mayday is confirmed.
- (B) Philadelphia Fire Department to evaluate Rapid Intervention Team (RIT) enhancement.
  - Comprehensive studies by other metro sized fire departments show, that at a minimum, 11-15 Firefighters are required to rescue 1 trapped Firefighter. As the PFD's RIT policy exists today, it falls short in providing adequate personnel and equipment to insure the best chance of survival for our Firefighters, in cases of extreme peril. A Ladder RIT Company, in and of itself, is not as large or diverse as it needs to be, to effectively conduct a cohesive and productive search and rescue

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<sup>1</sup> Refer to PFD O.P. #37, Self Contained Breathing Apparatus & PASS Devices.

operation. Special Operations Companies (SOC) should be considered as additions to all Rapid Intervention Teams.<sup>2</sup>

7. Upgrading PFD Personnel Accountability System. Functional and geographical assignments must be accounted for from the beginning until the termination of an incident. The components of the system should be modular and expand with the size and complexity of the incident.
8. The Philadelphia Fire Department must conduct training for all Firefighters on the management and control of all potential ventilation openings in a structure in order to limit fire growth and spread; and to control the flow path of inlet air and fire gases, during tactical operations. All ventilation should be coordinated with suppression activities. The Philadelphia Fire Department should evaluate National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) evidence-based practices for strategic and tactical Firefighter training.
9. Continuous training for all Firefighters on all fire ground disciplines (high rise, multiple alarm, Mayday, strategy and tactics, vacant structures, suppression systems ,building construction, hazardous materials in transportation, proper ventilation, etc.). This must include classroom and hands on training.
10. The PFD must initiate Command level training on all the same disciplines and a Command School for newly promoted Battalion/Deputy Chiefs.
11. Prior to the fire at 1655 Middleton St. the PFD permanently de-commissioned 5 engine and 2 ladder companies (January 5, 2009) and de-commissioned 2 PFD companies on a daily basis as per the “Rolling Brown Out Policy” (August 2, 2010). These actions had a severe impact on the fire department's ability to train its firefighters while still maintaining adequate fire protection for the public. On February 11, 2016, the City of Philadelphia announced an end to the practice of rolling brown outs. The City of Philadelphia should consider restoring the engine and ladder companies that were de-commissioned in 2009 in order to provide the necessary training required for a large urban fire department and an increased margin of safety for our firefighters and the public.
12. The current Fire Department training facility opened in 1980 and is no longer capable of meeting the training needs of the 5<sup>th</sup> largest Fire Department in the nation. The City of Philadelphia must make an investment into a state of the art training facility, either by upgrading the facility on Pennypack Street or by building a new facility. This facility must be capable of placing the Incident Commander, Division Supervisor and Company Officer “there” at the scene. It must be capable of simulating large scale, multi-faceted, multi-agency and complex incident scene operations.
13. An Operational Procedure must be developed for conducting a formal investigation into Firefighter fatalities and serious injuries. A report such as this should be generated for all fatalities and serious injuries. These reports should then be released throughout the Philadelphia Fire Department.

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<sup>2</sup>Refer to Ashville North Carolina, Phoenix Arizona, and Seattle Washington Fire Department Studies.

No formal PFD investigation was conducted for the following incidents:

- March 2, 2011. 1516 Judson Way. 1 near firefighter fatality.
- April 19, 2011. 860 N. 5<sup>th</sup> Street. 3 near firefighter fatalities.
- February 5, 2012. 1618 N. 20<sup>th</sup> Street. 3 near firefighter fatalities.
- April 9, 2012. 1817-41 E. York Street. 2 firefighter fatalities.
- April 6, 2013. 748 S. 4<sup>th</sup> Street. 1 firefighter fatality.

14. Establishing Officer Development for newly promoted Lieutenants and Captains to be instituted prior to an assignment to any unit.

15. The PFD must retain the position of Battalion Chief's Aide / Communications Specialist. The Aide / Communications Specialist is critical in order to maintain the command, communications and safety network. The Aide / Communications Specialist monitors multiple radio channels. The Aide / Communications Specialist establishes and maintains communications between the Fire Communications Center at Fire Headquarters, the incident commander, incoming engine and ladder companies and companies operating on the incident scene as well as outside agencies. The Aide / Communications Specialist accounts for companies on the incident scene, their geographic location and how long those companies have been operating. The Aide / Communications Specialist is essential to managing large, complex, multi faceted incidents such as the fire and Mayday operation that occurred at 1655 Middleton Street.

16. The PFD should give strong consideration to increasing staffing levels at the Fire Communications Center. At this point in time the FCC does not have any staff dedicated to monitor the operating fireground or TAC channel / talk group. The operating fireground or TAC channel / talkgroup is the radio channel that the incident commander, company officers and firefighters use when on the incident scene. It is the channel that almost all Mayday communications will take place. The FCC should have personnel dedicated to monitor this TAC channel / talk group in order to provide an optimum measure of safety to firefighters working at the scene of a fire and all other hazardous fire department responses.

## **IX. CHRONOLOGICAL FIRE DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS BOX 6542**

### **1655 MIDDLETON STREET**

- (I) Time taken from Incident History Printout.
- (B) Time taken from North Fire Talkgroup time line.
- (R) Time taken from North Tac 1 Talkgroup time line.
- (E) Estimated time of events taken from interviews.
- (G) Time taken from Global Positioning Tracking (GPS) tracking.

#### **02:49 Hours**

02:49:29 (I)

Call received via 911 at FCC from a female occupant of 1655 Middleton St., reporting smoke in her basement.

02:49:55(I)

E.73, E.63, L.08, L.21, Bn.02, North Fire, North Tac 1.

#### **02:50 Hours**

02:50:43 (I)

FCC dispatches M.16 on TB 6542, Woolston Ave. & Middleton St.

02:50:52 (I)

Bn.02 enroute.

#### **02:51 Hours**

02:51:10 (I)

E.63 enroute.

02:51:25 (I)

M.16 enroute.

02:51:30 (I)

L.21 enroute.

02:51:45 (I)

L.08 enroute.

#### **02:52 Hours**

02:52:10 (I)

E.73 enroute.

02:52:19 (B)

L.29 Officer asks FCC if he should respond on the Box to Woolston St.

02:52:42 (B)

FCC informs L.29 Officer negative, they need him for forced entry on his medical assignment.

#### **02:53 Hours**

02:53:43 (B)

E.73 on location at 1655 Middleton St., nothing showing. FCC informs E.73 that someone is supposed to be trapped in the living room.

02:53:59 (B)

FCC puts companies on reduced speed.



#### **02:54 Hours**

02:54:00 (E)

E.73 Officer stated occupant was standing at front door, the door was open.

02:54:27 (B)

Bn.02 arrives on location.

02:54:30 (E)

E.73 Officer is informed by the occupant at the front door of a fire in the basement. He has a haze of smoke on the 1st floor. The interior basement door is half, to fully open, with heavy dark brown smoke in the basement.

E.73 Officer orders E.73 Tip Firefighter & E.73 Pak to stretch 200' of 1 ¾" hose line from the apparatus to the 1st floor.

02:54:36 (R)

E.73 Officer raises Command; he has a fire in the basement, placing 1 & 1 in service. Command asks E.73 Officer what kind of fire he has down there.

#### **02:55 Hours**

02:55:21 (R)

Command raises Communications<sup>1</sup> and orders him to put 1 & 1 in service. "We have a 15' x 35' middle of the row, occupied, fire in the basement."

02:55:31 (G)

E.63 on location via GPS.<sup>2</sup>

02:55:42 (B)

Battalion Chief Aide 2 (BCA) reports to FCC: 2 story, middle of row, occupied dwelling, 15' x 35', fire in the basement placing 1 & 1 in service, Bravo & Delta same size & dimensions and occupied.

#### **02:56 Hours**

02:56:07 (B)

FCC orders companies to resume emergency speed.

02:56 (E)

E.73 Officer and E.73 Tip Firefighter stretch a 1 ¾" Hose Line (H.L.) through the 1st floor to the dining room. E.73 Pak is at the front door, flaking out H.L.. All have Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) in the Stand By position. Bn.02 enters the dwelling, has light smoke on 1st floor, proceeds to 2nd floor and has a 6" smoke layer at the ceiling. Bn.02 removes the occupant from the 2nd floor to the exterior. Smoke conditions are getting worse.

02:56:47 (R)

E.73 Officer orders E.73 DPOP to give him the water.

#### **02:57 Hours**

02:57:29 (R)

E.63 Officer reports to Command: nothing showing in the rear, then states "negative, I got fire 1st floor rear, kitchen area."

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<sup>1</sup> The terms Communications and Battalion Chief Aide (BCA) are interchangeable and refer to the same Firefighter performing the same function.

<sup>2</sup> Global Positioning System.

02:57 (E)

E.73 Officer & E.73 Tip Firefighter don SCBA face masks, fire is venting out the top of the basement doorway. They begin to discharge water via the cut out in dining room / kitchen wall. They knock down fire, but have heavy smoke on the 1<sup>st</sup> floor.

02:57:54 (B)

L.29 Officer makes himself available from the medical run.

### **02:58 Hours**

02:58:04 (I)

L.21 on location.

02:58:12 (R)

Command raises Communications to place 2 & 2 in service and strike out the box<sup>3</sup>. Command reports he has heavy fire in the basement. He has the 1st In Engine down there now, getting water on the fire.

02:58:38 (R)

E.63 Officer reports to Command he has light to medium smoke 1<sup>st</sup> & 2<sup>nd</sup> floors, in the rear.

02:58:52 (R)

Command attempts to raise L.08 Officer.

02:58 (E)

E.73 Officer & E.73 Tip Firefighter make the turn from the dining room into the kitchen and begin to extinguish fire at the basement door. E.73 Tip Firefighter has a SCBA issue and exits the fire dwelling.

02:58 (E)

E.73 Tip Firefighter passes E.73 Pak in the dining room. E.73 Officer then continues to operate E.73's H.L.

### **02:59 Hours**

02:59:28 (B)

BCA.2 to FCC: "On orders of Bn.02, strike out the box, placing 2 & 2 in service.

02:59:39 (R)

Command attempts to raise E.73 Officer.

02:59:44 (R)

E.63 Officer informs Command he is standing by, in the rear. Command orders E.63 to open up the rear.

E.63 Officer acknowledges.

02:59 (E)

L.21 Officer enters the fire dwelling and vents the 2<sup>nd</sup> floor front windows, sees a 20' portable ladder raised and basement windows being vented. He continues to search 2<sup>nd</sup> floor.

### **03:00 Hours**

03:00:05 (R)

Command attempts to raise L.08 Officer.

03:00:17 (R)

Command attempts to raise L.08 Officer.

03:00:23 (B)

FCC fills out Box 6542, Woolston Ave. & Middleton St

L.29 (RIT), SQ.72, E.51, PL19, Bn.09.

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<sup>3</sup> Box: 4 Engine Companies, 2 Ladder Companies and 2 Battalion Chiefs. When 2 Engines and 2 Ladder Companies are placed into service a Rapid Intervention Team (RIT) Ladder Company, Special Operations Company (SOC) and a Medic Unit are automatically dispatched.

03:00:26 (R)

L.08 Officer acknowledges Command, Command tells L.08 Officer he has to get this place ventilated for the 1st In Engine.

03:00:28 (I)

E.51 enroute.

03:00:59 (I)

Bn.09 enroute.

### **03:01 Hours**

03:01 (E)

E.73 Officer can hear someone pulling line for him in the dining room. E.63 Tip Firefighter forces rear door open.

03:01:16 (I)

PL.19 enroute.

03:01:19 (B)

L.29 Officer notifies FCC they are enroute from 11<sup>Th</sup> St & Godfrey Ave.

03:01:27 (R)

Command raises E.63 Officer and asks if they were able to get into the basement. E.63 Officer states affirmative.

03:01:47 (R)

Command attempts to raise E.73 Officer.

03:01:47 (B)

Sq.72 responding on Box.

03:01:58 (I)

Sq.72 enroute.

### **03:02 Hours**

03:02:03 (B)

FCC orders companies responding to 1655 Middleton St., with exception of E.51 & PL.19 to proceed in and go into service.

03:02:04 (R)

Command attempts to raise E.73 Officer.

03:02:15 (R)

Command orders E.73 Officer to back their line out; Command needs them back out front.

03:02:30 (R)

Communication attempts to raise Command.

03:02:33 (R)

L.21 Officer attempts to raise Command.

03:02:36 (R)

Command acknowledges L.21 Officer, L.21 Officer reports primary is negative.

03:02:36-45 (E)

E.73 Officer stated that a "fire ball" came up out of the basement. E.73 Officer was knocked over and immediately exited the dwelling. He does not encounter any Firefighters during his exit. He hears a Mayday as he exits the dwelling.

03:02:45 (B)

FCC raises BCA.2 to inform him that they are receiving an emergency activation from E.73 Pak radio on North Tac 1.

03:02:45 (R)

"Mayday, E.63 Pak trapped on the 1st floor."

03:02:55 (R)

Command attempts to raise E.63 Officer.

### **03:03 Hours**

03:03 (E)

Command, face to face, asks E.73 Officer as he exits the front door for the location of the missing Firefighter. E.73 Officer reports 1st floor. Command orders E.73 Officer, L.21 Pak, & L.21 Hook to enter the fire dwelling and search for the missing Firefighter.

03:03:06 (R)

E.73 Pushed To Talk button is depressed, but there is no audio.

03:03:09 (R)

Command raises E.63 Officer, E.63 Officer acknowledges, go ahead.

03:03:13 (I)

M.16 on location.

03:03:16 (R)

"E.73 Pak I am trapped on the 1st floor."

03:03:20 (B)

FCC attempts to raise BCA.2.

03:03:23 (R)

E.63 Officer to E.63 DPOP<sup>4</sup>: "give me the water."

03:03:26 (R)

"E.73 Pak I am trapped."

03:03:27 (B)

FCC attempts to raise BCA.2.

03:03:32 (R)

UNKNOWN: "You copy that? Charge the 3 inch."

03:03:33 (B)

FCC attempts to raise BCA.2.

03:03:35 (B)

L.08 Officer raises FCC to tell him to let Bn.02 know he is stuck behind some cars.

03:03:42 (R)

Communications attempts to raise Command.

03:03:51 (R)

"E.73 Pak (unreadable)".

03:03:55 (B)

FCC raises L.29 to change his assignment from RIT to 2nd due Ladder. FCC also assigns L.08 as the RIT.

03:03:59 (R)

L. 08 (unreadable).

### **03:04 Hours**

03:04:07 (B)

FCC raises BCA.2 to inform him that they are receiving an emergency activation from E.73 Pak and they are saying they are trapped in the basement. BCA.2 says affirmative, standby.

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<sup>4</sup> DPOP: Driver / Pump Operator or the Firefighter that drives an Engine Company and operates the pump.

03:04:14 (G)

E.51 on location via GPS

03:04:15 (R)

“(Unknown) Basement”

03:04:19 (R)

Command attempts to raise L.08 Officer.

03:04:19 (B)

FCC attempts to raise BCA.2.

03:04:25 (B)

FCC attempts to raise BCA.2.

03:04:30 (E)

L.21 Officer, who was operating on the 2<sup>nd</sup> floor, states that he was met with extreme heat from “above and below”. He stated that he would not survive if he did not exit. L.21 Officer crawled down the steps to the 1<sup>st</sup> floor on his stomach and exited the dwelling without his helmet and flashlight. He stated that he could hear someone yelling for help “really loud” on his way out.

03:04:33 (R)

Communication raises Command to ask for orders for the 3rd and 4th due Engine Companies and to tell Command they are getting an emergency activation from the Pak.

03:04:39 (G)

L.29 on location via GPS.

03:04:49 (B)

FCC attempts to raise BCA.2.

03:04:56 (I)

Bn.09 on location.

03:04:56 (R)

Communications raises E.51 Officer: “(unreadable), front of building.”

### **03:05 Hours**

03:05 (E)

Bn.09 proceeds to rear of the fire dwelling, E.63’s H.L. is uncharged, rear door is wide open. There is heavy smoke conditions, 1<sup>st</sup> & 2<sup>nd</sup> floor windows are intact. As L.29 passes the front of fire dwelling, L.29 Pak reports heavy fire venting from the basement window.

03:05:08 (B)

FCC raises BCA.2 to inform him that L.08 is the RIT and L.29 is now the 2nd due Ladder.

03:05:11 (R)

“E.73 Pak (unreadable)”.

03:05:18 (R)

Command attempts to raise L.08 Officer.

03:05:23 (R)

E.63 Officer raises Command. Command acknowledges, E.63 Officer does not respond.

03:05:38 (R)

Communications raises Command, tells him he has L.29 & L.08 outside.

03:05:43 (G)

PL.19 on location via GPS.

03:05:54 (R)

“(Unknown) Give us more pressure, a little more pressure in the 3 inch.”



### **03:06 Hours**

03:06:06 (R)

"E.73 Pak (difficult to understand) E.73 can't breathe, I can't breathe."

03:06:20 (R)

Command raises E.73 Officer and asks him if he has had any luck. E.73 Officer replies: "negative chief, still (unreadable) and searching."

03:06:40 (R)

Command attempts to raise E.63 Officer

03:06:46 (R)

Bn.09 raises Command; he states that he is in the rear. E.63 has a line, they have a shot to the basement. We have heavy smoke conditions on all floors. E.63 can advance if you don't have anybody in there. Command informs Bn.09 that he has a search party on the 1st floor, he has a member down on the 1st floor and they are trying to get her.

03:06:46

Bn.09 states he has E.63 with a line ready to go, can he send them in? Command informs Bn.09 to be careful in the basement area, he has members on the 1st floor. Bn.09 reports that E.63 has water on the fire in the basement, they are advancing on the fire.

### **03:07 Hours**

03:07:22 (B)

FCC raises BCA.2 to ask if he has any information on the Emergency Button Activation, BCA.2 says standby.

03:07:40 (R)

Bn.09 attempts to raise Bn.02.

03:07:47 (R)

Command attempts to raise E.73 Officer.

03:07:51 (B)

ES.10 raises FCC to order a 2<sup>nd</sup> Medic Unit for the fireground.

03:07:57 (R)

Command raises E.73 Officer and asks him how he is making out now. E.73 Officer states: "we need a line on the 1st floor, Chief." Command asks E.73 Officer how he is making out with his person. E.73 Officer replies: "Still negative, sir."

### **03:08 Hours**

03:08 (E)

L.29 is ventilating 1<sup>st</sup> & 2<sup>nd</sup> floors, rear of fire dwelling via 16' & 20' portable ladders. L.21 Pak & L.21 Hook exit fire dwelling with low air. E.73 Tip Firefighter re-enters fire dwelling, in 1st floor front.

03:08:00 (B)

BCA.2 raises FCC to ask if " (unreadable) is on the fireground."

03:08:12 (B)

FCC asks BCA.2 if he is trying to raise radio. BCA.2 asks if L.08 is on the fireground. FCC replies OK.

03:08:28 (R)

FCC attempts to raise BCA.2 on North Tac 1.

03:08:37 (B)

FCC raises BCA.2 to inform him that there is an emergency activation from Sq.72 Officer and he is still waiting on a report on E.73 Pak radio.

03:08:43 (R)

Command attempts to raise Charlie Division.

03:08:51 (R)

Sq. 72 Officer attempts to raise Command.

03:08:54 (B)

FCC dispatches M.29 on Box 6542.

03:08:56 (R)

Communications raises Command to ask if he is putting the RIT in service.

### **03:09 Hours**

03:09:07 (R)

Sq. 72 Officer attempts to raise Command.

03:09:27 (R)

Bn.09 raises Command, informs him E.63 is advancing on the fire in the basement, still have heavy smoke conditions on all floors.

03:09:41 (R)

Command attempts to raise E.73 Officer.

03:09 (E)

E.73 Officer and E.73 Tip Firefighter, exit the fire dwelling. As they exit, E.51 Officer & Sq.72 Officer, with their companies, are about to enter with E.51's 1 ¾" H.L.. E.51 Officer yells out "We got her", Members of Sq.72, E.51, and L.21 at the front entrance mistake the E.73 Tip Firefighter for the missing E.73 Pak Firefighter.

03:09:50 (R)

Communications raises Command to ask if they cleared that emergency for E.73 Pak. Command states: "that's affirmative, reset and unfounded."

03:09 (E)

E.73 Tip Firefighter removes her SCBA mask and immediately, E.73 Officer notifies Command, face to face, that there is still a missing member. Command orders Sq.72 & E.51 Officers, face to face, to continue searching for the E73 Pak Firefighter on the 1st floor.

### **03:10 Hours**

03:10:16 (R)

Command raises communications and orders the 4<sup>th</sup> due Engine Company to the Bravo Exposure.

03:10:27 (R)

Communications raises PL.19 Officer and sends him to the Bravo Exposure.

03:10:40 (R)

Charlie Division raises Command; E.63 has the bulk of the fire knocked down in the basement. Ladder Companies are ventilating.

03:10 (E)

Sq.72 & E.51 are extinguishing heavy fire in the living room and searching for the missing member.

### **03:11 Hours**

03:11:00 (G)

L.08 on location via GPS.

03:11:14 (B)

FCC attempts to raise BCA.2.

03:11:24 (R)

Command attempts to raise E.51 Officer.

03:11:34 (B)

BCA.2 raises FCC. FCC gives an elapsed time of 22 minutes and asks for a progress report. BCA.2 states that the bulk of the fire has been knocked down in the basement, fire has extended to the 1st and 2nd floors, all hands are in service, companies making progress. BCA.2 asks for a rundown of Medic Units on the box.

**03:12 Hours**

03:12:03 (B)

FCC informs BCA.2 that he has M.16 and M.29. FCC asks for the status of Sq.72 Officer's Emergency Button Activation. BCA.2 informs FCC that Sq.72 was accidental and he is resetting. BCA.2 orders M.16 to the front of the fire dwelling.

03:12:06 (R)

"(Unknown) Fire is knocked down in the basement."

03:12:33 (B)

FCC dispatches Deputy 02, Rescue 01, & ES.06 on Box 6543, Woolston Ave. & Middleton St.

03:12:34 (R)

PL.19 DPOP raises PL.19 Officer. PL.19 Officer tells him to hold up on the water.

03:12 (E)

Sq.72, and E.51 continue to extinguish fire on the 1st floor with a 1 ¾" H.L., as they search.

**03:13 Hours**

03:13:04 (B)

Deputy 02 enroute.

03:13:05 (R)

Command attempts to raise Charlie Division.

03:13:44 (R)

Command raises Charlie Division and tells him to have E.63 check the basement to make sure there is nobody down there. Charlie acknowledges the message and states Ladder Companies are overhauling right now.

03:13:50 (B)

ES.10 attempts to raise M.29.

03:13:58 (B)

FCC attempts to raise M.16.

**03:14 Hours**

03:14 (E)

L.08 joins Sq.72 and E.51 while they extinguish fire on 1st floor with 1 ¾" H.L. and search for missing Firefighter.

03:14:11 (B)

FCC raises BCA.2 to inform him that he is unable to reach M.16. BCA.2 reports that they are on the fireground.

03:14:16 (R)

PL.19 Officer raises Command and tells him that Bravo is clear, just trapped smoke. Command orders PL.19 to check Delta.

03:14:44 (B)

ES.10 raises FCC with orders for M.29 to setup at Rodney & Wister Sts., in front of PL.19. FCC relays those orders to M.29.

03:14:46 (I)

Rescue 01 enroute.

### **03:15 Hours**

03:15 (E)

Ladder 29 Pak enters the fire dwelling at 1st floor, rear dining room window via a 16' portable ladder.

03:15:14 (B)

ES.6 enroute.

03:15:21 (R)

Command raises Sq.72 Officer, Sq.72 Officer reports he has a man down, " we're bringing him out."

Command acknowledges the message.

03:15:25 (E)

Sq.72, E.51, L.29, L.08 members are all involved in removal of the downed Firefighter from the fire dwelling.

03:15:27 (B)

FM 21 enroute.

### **03:16 Hours**

03:16:07 (R)

E.51 Officer raises Command, he states that Sq.72 found her and they are bringing her out now.

Command acknowledges and orders E.51 to the 2nd floor.

03:16:23 (R)

E.63 Officer attempts to raise Command.

03:16:31 (R)

L.08 Officer attempts to raise Command.

03:16:39 (R)

L.21 Roof raises Command to inform him that there is heavy smoke coming through the roof and they have a glow coming through the holes. Command acknowledges Ladder 21 Roof.

03:16:58 (R)

Command raises E.51 Officer, he tells E.51 he needs the 1 ¾" H.L. up on the 2nd floor.

03:16 (E)

Sq.72, E.51, L.21, & L.08 members remove E.73 Pak Firefighter to the exterior walkway and place her on M.16's Reeves Stretcher. Her SCBA is removed and CPR is initiated on the exterior walkway.

### **03:17 Hours**

03:17 (E)

E.73 Pak Firefighter is transferred from the Reeves to a gurney, placed in the rear of M.16. Advanced Life Support intervention begins with members of M.16 and M.29.

03:17:06 (B)

FCC raises BCA.2 to inform him that there is an emergency activation for E.73 Pak on the PHL Talk Group.

03:17:29 (R)

Command attempts to raise Sq.72 Officer.

### **03:18 Hours**

03:18:47 (R)

E.51 Officer raises Command to inform him that they are going to try and make the 2nd floor, but they need somebody on the 1st floor. Command informs E.51 Officer that he has E.19 coming in with a line.

03:18 (E)

Members of M.16 and M.29 continue to administer ALS intervention in rear of M.16 to E.73 Pak Firefighter.

### **03:19 Hours**

03:19:04 (R)

PL.19 Officer attempts to raise PL.19 DPOP, asking for water.

03:19:28 (B)

FCC raises BCA.2 to ask for a progress report from the Incident Commander, gives elapsed time of the fire at 30 minutes.

03:19:43 (R)

Command attempts to raise Charlie Division.

03:19:46 (R)

Communications raises Command to ask for a progress report and informs Command that elapsed time of the fire is 30 minutes. Command states they have the bulk of fire knocked down, they're pulling ceilings and walls to check for extension of fire. All hands are in service.

03:19 (E)

Members of M.16 and M.29 continue to administer ALS intervention to E.73 Pak in rear of M.16.

### **03:20 Hours**

03:20:12 (R)

L.21 roof raises Command to tell him that there is fire through the roof. Command informs him that there is a line going to the 2nd floor now.

03:20:29 (R)

E.51 Officer raises Command to inform him that they are on the 2nd floor. Command states he needs them on the 2nd floor because he has fire through the roof. E. 51 Officer states they don't have much fire up there, " we are knocking it down but we can't see where it is going through the roof."

03:20:35 (B)

FCC raises BCA.2 to inform him that they are receiving E.73 Pak radio emergency activation again on South Fire. BCA.2 states that he is in search of that radio.

03:20:40 (B)

BCA.2 gives progress report from the Incident Commander. They have the bulk of the fire knocked down, all hands are in service and companies are making progress.

03:20:50 (R)

Command raises L.08 Officer to tell him he needs hooks up on the 2nd floor. He needs the ceilings pulled.

03:20:58 (B)

ES.10 requests a 3rd Medic Unit for this incident.

03:20 (E)

Members of M.16 and M.29 continue to administer ALS intervention in M.16. E.73 Pak portable radio emergency activations on South Fire occurred accidentally.

### **03:21 Hours**

03:21:07 (R)

Charlie Division raises Command to inform him he has fire along the roof line, in the rear. The fire has been extinguished in the basement area.

03:21:10 (B)

FCC dispatches M.10 on Box 6542, Woolston Ave. and Middleton St.

03:21:25 (R)

L.21 Officer raises Command to tell him he has “ fire from the front to the back in between the ceilings. We are going to need hooks up here.” Command acknowledges the message.

03:21:44 (R)

Command raises E.19 Officer to order him to the 2nd floor with a 2nd line. He needs 2 lines up there to start knocking down the fire. PL.19 Officer acknowledges the order.

03:21 (E)

Members of M.16 and M.29 continue with ALS intervention in M.16. L.29 Pak prepares to drive M.16 to the hospital with 2 members of M.16 and 1 member of M.29 in the rear of the unit.

#### **03:22 Hours – 03:28 Hours**

03:22 -03:28 (E)(R)

Members of M.16 and M.29 continue ALS intervention efforts on E.73 Pak in rear of M. 16. Command continues firefighting efforts.

03:28:45 (B)

Division 02 on location.

#### **03:29 Hours – 03:31 Hours**

03:29-03:31 (E)(R)

Members of M.16 and M.29 continue ALS intervention efforts on E.73 Pak in rear of M. 16. Command continues firefighting efforts.

03:31:50 (B)

BCA.2 contacts FCC and places the fire under control by orders of Bn.02.

#### **03:32 Hours – 03:33 Hours**

03:33:00 (I)

M.16 enroute to Albert Einstein Medical Center (AEMC), Code Blue, ETA, 5-10 minutes.



## **X. RADIO TRANSMISSION TIME LINE**

Tuesday, December 9th, 2014 BOX 6542  
Woolston Avenue & Middleton Street AOF:  
1655 Middleton St.

Green = 911 Calls

Black = NF Talkgroup

Red = NT1 Talkgroup

2:49:28	Call received via 911 from a female occupant of 1655 Middleton Street reporting smoke in her house.
2:49:59	PA,NF: TB 6542, Woolston Ave. & Middleton St., E73, E63, L8, L21, B2 for a fire reported at 1655 Middleton Street. North Fire and North Tac1.
2:50:47	PA, NF, NM: M16 Dispatched on TB 6542, Wollston Ave. & Middleton St.
2:51:16	M16 in route to 1655 Middleton Street.
2:51:56	L8 in route to 1655 Middleton Street.
2:52:09	E73 in route to 1655 Middleton Street.
2:52:19	NF Operator raises L29. L29 asks if he should respond on the Box to Woolston.
2:52:42	NF Operator raises L29 and tells him negative, they need him for forced entry on his medical assignment.
2:52:54	NF Operator announces safety quip for the fire on Middleton Street.
2:53:34	NF Operator attempts to raise B2 Aide.
2:53:43	E73 on location at 1655 Middleton Street, nothing showing. The NF Operator informs E73 that someone is supposed to be trapped in the living room.
2:53:59	NF Operator puts companies on reduced speed.
2:54:27	B2 Aide arrives on location, report to follow.
2:54:36	E73 raises command to tell him that he has a fire in the basement, placing 1 & 1 in service. Command asks E73 what kind of fire he has down there.
2:55:21	Command raises communications and orders him to put 1 & 1 in service. We have a 15 x 35 middle of the row, occupied, fire in the basement.
2:55:42	B2 Aide reports they have a 2 Story, middle of the row, occupied dwelling, 15 x 35, fire in the basement. Placing 1 & 1 in service, Bravo & Delta same size and dimensions and occupied.

2:56:07	NF Operator has companies resume emergency speed.
2:56:47	E73 to E73 Driver: Give me the water.
2:57:29	E63 Command reports nothing showing in the rear. Unknown states negative, I got fire first floor rear kitchen area.
2:57:54	L29 makes himself available from the medic run.
2:58:07	L21 attempts to raise command.

2:58:12	Command raises communications to place 2 and 2 in service and strike out a box. Command reports he has heavy fire in the basement. He has the first in engine down there now getting water on the fire.
2:58:38	E63 to command, he has light to medium smoke first and second floors in the rear.
2:58:52	Command attempts to raise L8.
2:59:28	B2 Aide: On orders of B2, strike out the Box, placing 2 & 2 in service.
2:59:39	Command attempts to raise E73 Officer.
2:59:44	E63 states he is standing by in the rear. Command orders E63 to open up the rear. E63 acknowledges ( <i>Part of message unreadable</i> ) says something about the basement level.
3:00:05	Command attempts to raise L8.
3:00:17	Command attempts to raise L8 Officer.
3:00:23	PA, NF: Box 6542, Woolston Ave. & Middleton St., L29 (RIT), Sq72, E51, P19, B9.
3:00:26	L8 Officer acknowledges command, command tells L8 Officer her has to get this place ventilated for the first in Engine.
3:01:08	E51 in route to Box.
3:01:19	L29 in route to 1655 Middleton St. from 11th & Godfrey.
3:01:27	Command raises E63 Officer and asks if they were able to get into the basement. E63 Officer states affirmative.
3:01:32	B2 Aide asks NF Operator who is 4th in company. He is told P19.
3:01:47	Sq72 in route.
3:01:47	Command attempts to raise E73 Officer.
3:01:53	Unknown: Someone asking for a medic unit on the Box during Squad 72's transmission.
3:02:03	NF Operator: Orders companies responding to 1655 Middleton Street, with the exception of E51 and P19 to proceed in and go into service.

3:02:04	Command attempts to raise E73 Officer.
3:02:15	Command orders E73 to back their line out. Command needs them back out front here.
3:02:30	Communications attempts to raise command.
3:02:33	L21 Officer attempts to raise command.
3:02:36	Command: Go ahead, L21 Command says primary is negative.
3:02:45	NF Operator raises B2 Aide to inform him that they are receiving an emergency activation from E73 Pack radio on NT1.
3:02:45	MAYDAY, E63 Pack trapped on the first floor.
3:02:55	Command attempts to raise E63 Officer.
3:03:06	E73.
3:03:09	Command raises E63 Officer. E63 acknowledges, go ahead.
3:03:16	I am trapped on the first floor (unreadable), E73 pack.
3:03:20	NF Operator attempts to raise B2 Aide.
3:03:23	E63 give me the water.
3:03:26	E73 Pack: I am trapped.

3:03:27	NF Operator attempts to raise B2 Aide.
3:03:32	Unk: You copy that (unreadable) charge the 3 inch.
3:03:33	NF Operator attempts to raise B2 Aide.
3:03:35	L8 raises the NF Operator to tell him to let B2 know he is stuck behind some cars.
3:03:42	Communications attempts to raise command.
3:03:51	E73 pack unreadable.
3:03:55	NF Operator raises L29 to change his assignment from RIT to 2nd due Ladder. He also assigns L8 as the RIT.
3:03:59	L8 (unreadable).
3:04:07	NF Operator raises B2 Aide to inform him that they are receiving an emergency activation from E73 Pack and they are saying they are trapped in the basement. B2 Aide says affirmative, standby.
3:04:15	Unknown basement.
3:04:19	Command attempts to raise L8 Officer.
3:04:19	NF Operator attempts to raise B2 Aide.
3:04:25	NF Operator attempts to raise B2 Aide.

3:04:33	Communications raises command to ask for orders for 3rd & 4th, and to tell command they are getting an emergency activation from the pack.
3:04:38	ES10 in route on the Box.
3:04:49	NF Operator attempts to raise B2 Aide.
3:04:56	Communications raises E51 Officer, <i>unreadable</i> front of building.
3:05:08	NF Operator raises B2 Aide to inform him that L8 is the RIT and L29 is now 2nd due.
3:05:11	E73 Pack <i>unreadable</i> .
3:05:18	Command attempts to raise L8 Officer.
3:05:23	E63 attempts raises command. Command acknowledges but E63 does not respond.
3:05:38	Communications raises command, He tells command that he has L29 and L8 out here.
3:05:54	Unknown: Give us more pressure. A little more pressure in that 3 inch.
3:06:04	L29 arrives on the fireground.
3:06:06	E73 Pack: hard to understand, E73 can't breath, I can't breath E73 Pack.
3:06:20	Command raises E73 Officer and asks him if he has had any luck. E73 Officer replies negative chief, still ( <i>unreadable</i> ) and searching.
3:06:40	Command attempts to raise E63 Officer.
3:06:42	COVERS: E9-19, P61-63, E7-72, E59-51, L22-29, L25-21

3:06:46	BC9 raises command, he states that he is in the rear. E63 has a line, they have a shot to the basement. We have heavy smoke conditions on all floors. E63 can advance if you don't have anybody in there. Command informs BC9 that he has a search party on the first floor, we have a member down on the first floor and we are in there trying to get her. B9 states he has E63 with a line ready to go, can I send them in? Command informs B9 to be careful in the basement area, he has members on the first floor. B9 reports that E63 has water on the fire in the basement, we are advancing on the fire.
3:07:22	NF Operator raises B2 Aide to ask if he any information on the emergency button activation. B2 says standby.
3:07:40	Command (BC9) attempts to raise BC2.
3:07:47	Command attempts to raise E73 Officer.
3:07:51	ES10 raises the NF Operator to order a 2nd Medic Unit for the fireground.

3:07:57	Command raises E73 Officer and asks him how are we making out now. E73 Command states we need a line on the first floor chief. Command asks E73 Command how he is making out with your person. E73 replies still negative sir.
3:08:00	BC2A raises NF Operator to ask if <i>(unreadable)</i> is on the fireground.
3:08:12	NF Operator asks B2 Aide if he is trying to raise radio. B2 Aide asks if L8 is on the fireground? NF Operator replies OK.
3:08:28	NF Operator attempts to raise BC2 Aide on NT1.
3:08:37	NF Operator raises B2 Aide to inform him that there is an emergency activation for Sq72 Officer and he is still waiting on a report for E73 Pack radio.
3:08:43	Command attempts to raise Charlie sector.
3:08:51	Sq72 attempts to raise command.
3:08:54	NF, SF, PA, NM, SM: M29 dispatched on Box 6542, Woolston Ave. & Middleton St.
3:08:56	Communications raises comand to ask if he is putting the RIT in service.
3:09:07	Sq72 Officer attempts to raise command.
3:09:27	B9 raises command, E63 is advancing on the fire in the basement, still have heavy smoke condtions on all floors.
3:09:41	Command attempts to raise E73 Officer.
3:09:50	Communications raises command to ask if we cleared that emergency for E73 Pack. Command states that's affirmative, reset and unfounded.
3:10:16	Command raises communications and orders the 4th in company to the bravo exposure.
3:10:16	B2 Aide raises NF Operator, No Message received.
3:10:27	Communications raises P19 and sends him to the bravo exposure.
3:10:40	Charlie sector raises command, E63 has the bulk of the fire knocked down in the basement. Ladder companies are ventilating also.
3:11:14	NF Operator attempts to raise B2 Aide.
3:11:24	Command attempts to raise E51 Officer.

3:11:34	B2 Aide raises NF Operator. NF Operator gives an elapsed time of fire of 22 minutes and asks for a progress report. B2 Aide states that the bulk of the fire has been knocked down in the basement, fire has extended to the first and second floor, all hands are in service, companies making progress. B2 Aide asks for a rundown of Medic Units on the BOX.
3:12:03	NF Operator informs B2 Aide that he has M16 and M29. NF operator also asks for the status of Sq72 officer's emergency button activation. B2 Aide informs NF Operator that Sq72 was accidental and he is resetting. B2 Aide orders M16 to the front of the fire dwelling.
3:12:06	Unknown: Fire is looking knocked down in the basement.
3:12:33	NF, SF, NM, SM, PA: D2, R1, ES6 dispatched on BOX 6542, Woolston Ave. & Middleston St.
3:12:34	P19 DPOP raises P19 Officer and tells him to hold up on the water.
3:13:04	D2 in route.
3:13:05	Command attempts to raise Charlie division.
3:13:44	Command raises Charlie and tells him to have E63 check the basement to make sure there is nobody down there. Charlie acknowledges the messages and states that Ladder Companies are overhauling right now.
3:13:50	ES10 attempts to raise M29.
3:13:58	NF Operator attempts to raise M16.
3:14:11	NF Operator raises B2 Aide to inform him that he is unable to reach M16. B2 Aide reports they are on the fireground.
3:14:16	P19 officer raises command and tells him that Bravo is clear, just trapped smoke. Command orders P19 to check Delta.
3:14:44	ES10 raises the NF Operator with orders for M29 to setup at Rodney & Wister in front of P19. NF Operator relays those orders to M29.
3:15:14	ES6 in route.
3:15:21	Command raises Sq72, Sq72 reports he has a man down, we're bringing him out. Command acknowledges the message.
3:15:27	FM21 in route.
3:16:03	Unknown transmission.
3:16:07	E51 raises command, he states that E72 found her and their bringing her out now. Command acknowledges and orders E51 to the 2nd floor.
3:16:23	E63 attempts to raise Command.
3:16:31	L8 attempts to raise command.



3:16:39	L21 roof raises command to inform him that there is heavy smoke coming through the roof and we have a glow coming through the holes. Command acknowledges L21 Roof.
3:16:58	Command raises E51, he tells E51 he needs the 1 3/4 up on the 2nd floor.

3:17:06	NF Operator raises B2 Aide to inform him that there is an emergency activation for E73 Pack on the PHL Talkgroup.
3:17:29	Command attempts to raise Sq72 Officer.
3:17:58	SA10 in route.
3:18:47	E51 raises command to inform him that they are going to try and make the 2nd floor now, but they need somebody on the 1st floor. Command informs E51 that he has E19 coming in with a line.
3:19:04	P19 Officer attempts to raise P19 DPOP asking for water.
3:19:28	NF Operator raises B2 Aide to ask for a progress report from the I.C. He also gives him the elapsed time of the fire at 30 minutes.
3:19:43	Command attempts to raise Charlie division.
3:19:46	Communications raises command to ask for a progress report and inform command that the elapsed time of the fire is 30 minutes. Command gives a progress report that they have the bulk of the fire knocked down, we're pulling ceiling and walls to check for extension of fire. All hands are in service.
3:20:12	L21 Roof raises command to tell him that there is fire through the roof. Command informs L21 Roof that there is a line going to the 2nd floor now.
3:20:29	E51 raises command to inform him that they are on the 2nd floor. Command states that he needs them on the 2nd floor because he has fire through the roof upstairs. E51 states they don't have much fire up there, we are knocking it down but we can't see where it is going through the roof.
3:20:35	NF Operator raises B2 Aide to inform him that they are receiving E73 Pack radio emergency activation again on South Fire. B2 Aide states that he is in search of that radio now.
3:20:40	B2 Aide gives a progress report from the I.C., they have the bulk of the fire knocked down, all hands are in service and companies are making progress.
3:20:50	Command raises L8 Officer to tell him he needs hooks up on the 2nd floor. He needs the ceilings pulled.

3:20:58	ES10 requests a 3rd medic unit for this incident.
3:21:07	Charlie Division raises command to inform him he has fire along the roof line in the rear. The fire has been extinguished in the basement area.
3:21:10	NF, SF, PA, NM, SM: M10 dispatched on Box 6542, Woolston Ave. & Middleton St.
3:21:25	L21 Officer raises command to tell him he has fire from the front to the back in between the ceilings, we are going to need hooks up here. Command acknowledges the message.
3:21:44	Command raises E19 to order him to the 2nd floor with a second line. He needs two lines up there to start knocking down this fire. E19 Officer acknowledges the order.

3:22:13	Unknown carrier, echo effect and someone says come on baby.
3:22:30	Command raises E51 Officer to see if he is making progress up there. E51 Officer states he can do it with one line, he just needs to get these ceilings open. Command informs E51 officer that L8 is coming up to pull ceilings.
3:22:41	NF Operator attempts to raise ES10.
3:22:59	E51 raises command to inform him that E19 is going to take the front and we are going to take the rear.
3:23:12	Command raises charlie division and request he move to the interior. He needs him on the 2nd floor to guide these guys. Charlie states he is in the basement and he will work his way up.
3:23:41	Command attempts to raise L21 Officer.
3:24:09	L21 Officer attempts to raise L21 Pack.
3:24:14	Unknown open carrier.
3:24:20	NF Operator raises B2 Aise and asks him to call Fire Communications Supervisor.
3:24:28	Command raises communications to ask who is our RIT team. Communications informs him it is L8 and asks if he wants another ladder company.
3:25:02	Command raises E19 Officer to ask him how he is making out up there. E19 Officer replies that we have fire in the whole roof. We are opening up the ceilings. E51 took the rear and we have the front making good progress.

3:25:49	Command raises L21 Officer to tell him that he needs to know if there is any extension into the exposures as soon as you get into them. L21 Officer states that he is checking the bravo, right now it is negative. We are putting holes into the middle, rear and front bedroom. We have the camera, negative on th extensions.
3:26:15	FM21 on location.
3:26:22	Interior attempts to raise command.
3:26:34	Unreadable carrier.
3:26:39	Interior, interior.
3:26:43	L21 Officer attempts to raise L21 Pack.
3:26:52	Command raises interior division to ask for nature and conditions on the 2nd floor. Interior states he has companies opening all the ceilings. He has spotted some fire, he has two lines with E51 and E19 making good progress. Command tells interior it looks much better and all the fireis knocked down in the front.
3:27:25	L21 Officer raises command to tell him he checked the bravo extension for extension. It's negative. We do have heavy smoke conditions but no extension at this time. Command tells L21 Officer to get the windows opened to get it smoked out and let him know how you make out with bravo.

3:27:53	L21 Command raises L21 Hook, Let Danny check that, we are going over here to open up some windows.
3:28:45	D2 on location.
3:28:52	NF Operator raises B2 Aide to notify him that D2 is on the fireground. He also gives him an elapsed time of fire of 40 minutes and asks for a progress report.
3:29:56	E51 raises command to inform him that it looks like they have most of the fire knocked down, we are pulling ceilings to look for trapped fire. Command acknowledges the message and tells him to pull ceilings from the front to the back and make sure there is no fire in the ceilings.
3:30:09	B2 Aide gives a progress report from the I.C., he reports that the bulk of the fire is knocked down, all hands are in service, companies are checking for extesnsions.
3:31:00	SA10 on location.
3:31:02	Command raises interior to ask him if he is comfortable with putting the fire under control. Interior states yes, ladder companies are still opening ceilings, we havn't found anymore fire, it looks pretty good.

3:31:23	Command raises L21 Officer to ask the condition of the extensions. L21 Command states that Bravo and Delta are negative. The windows are opened and they are ventilating.
3:31:50	B2 Aide places fire under control by orders of BC2.
3:32:04	NF, SF, PA, NM, SM: Fire is under control on BOX 6542, Woolston Ave. & Middleton St.
3:32:52	D2 attempts to raise command.
3:33:36	R1 attempts to raise command.
3:33:54	L21 Roof attempts to raise command.