

# Goode Work



**The Honorable W. Wilson Goode, Jr.**

**City Councilman At-Large**

## INTRODUCTION

On the first Friday afternoon in January of 2000, after being sworn-in as the youngest member of Philadelphia City Council that week, I gathered my staff for our first official meeting – at 4 o'clock sharp.

I was focused on various objectives – to communicate my political philosophy, as well as my proposed legislative and policy agenda, and to also see which of my staff members would be looking at their watches to see when 5 o'clock arrived.

My staff was initially comprised of five positions: a chief of staff, a special assistant for policy and planning, a legislative assistant, and two executive assistants. All of them were engaged in the policy discussion which lasted well beyond the 5 o'clock hour. (Two terms later, the two executive assistants, Sadique Akbar and Latrice Bryant, serve as my chief of staff and chief legislative aide).

In that meeting, I articulated our mission statement as concisely as possible. I told my staff that our legislative agenda was, in fact, the same as my life work – “to create new opportunities for economically disadvantaged persons, businesses, and neighborhoods”.

My challenge was to take my experience as an economic development administrator in local government and to have it result in meaningful new public policy and enacted legislation.

I posed a policy question to open the discussion. The question was, “Who shall be poor? And after our work is done, will we have changed the answer to that question?”

I first considered that question, as it was presented to me in a book titled, “The End of Liberalism”, by Theodore J. Lowi. The book was assigned reading as part of my graduate coursework at the University of Pennsylvania’s Fels Center of Government. Consequently, it became an academic exercise that still influences my public policy and legislative work. Not because I agreed with Lowi, but because he did present a credible public policy analysis related to economic opportunity. It was the first time that I truly thought about the issue of poverty from an economic policy perspective – it was also precisely when I became an independent thinker related to economic theory. My academic focus shifted toward a need to redefine “welfare economics” and my future work as an economic development professional later centered on crafting new opportunities. As a freshman councilman, the goal for me had to be the crafting of legislation from my own independent thought.

The first answer provided – to the question posed at my first legislative staff meeting - was that there was no way to know who will be “poor”. So I rephrased the question, “Not specifically, but in general, who shall be poor?” No one wanted to answer.

Then I simply stated, “Don’t we already know, in general, who will be poor? Won’t it be mostly women, children, and people of color? And won’t that still be true in 10 years and in 20 years from now?”

They simply nodded. Then I reiterated, “That’s why we’re here - to create new opportunities for economically disadvantaged persons, businesses, and neighborhoods”.

If there was an objective answer to the question of poverty that was totally unrelated to race, sex, or social condition – my policy and legislative agenda might be different.

But poverty has a face. In fact, poverty has a few faces – past, present, and future.

Unfortunately, a person’s economic condition is not only subject to national and global influences, nor is it simply attributable to academic and social upbringing – real disparities persist related to race, sex, and other disadvantages.

I could not honorably serve as a lawmaker without believing that there ought to be a law... creating new opportunities for the economically disadvantaged in Philadelphia.

So I’ve crafted many laws...creating several new economic opportunities.


## Fair Lending and Community Reinvestment

Within weeks of being sworn-in on January 3, 2000 – my office released our first policy paper titled, “Greater Philadelphia Capital Access Report”. The Capital Access Report was an examination of small business lending patterns within the region. The report data came from information required from banks and financial institutions under the federal Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). An amendment to CRA regulations made small business loan data available as of 1998. Before that, the submission of home mortgage data had been required since 1977. Ironically, the small business loan data from 1998 became publicly available as I was being elected to City Council, so my first policy initiative promised to be groundbreaking. It was no coincidence that the special assistant that I hired was a doctoral candidate at the University of Pennsylvania who had already purchased the data and was developing the methodology to produce the report.

E. Matthew Quigley (Matt), my special assistant, worked within my office for over two and a half years, quickly rising to the position of chief legislative aide. Matt authored five policy papers for my office and went on to work for the Federal Reserve Bank system and the United State Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. Matt’s first report was groundbreaking, as promised, and it created instant credibility for me as a freshman lawmaker in my early thirties and for him as a policy director in his early twenties.

The Capital Access Report proved that there were stark disparities in small business lending within the region when examined by the race or income of neighborhoods. In fact, in 1998, about 90 percent of small business lending was done in middle-and upper

income areas and over 90 percent of the loan dollars went to areas with less than a twenty percent population of African-Americans. The comprehensive report was featured in the Philadelphia Business Journal, as well as other local news publications, and the local banking and financial services industry was intrigued by the policy work. Rather than simply being embarrassed by its findings, the industry sought more information about those under-served markets that may represent new opportunities for business growth.



Most people who became familiar with the report were focused on its findings and comprehensiveness, so most people lost sight of its policy recommendations. Matt did the research and writing, but I developed the recommendations for the report.

There were two models presented as recommended strategies to address the lending disparities disclosed by the report.

### *The CDFI Model*

The first strategy recommended was the increased utilization of community development financial institutions (CDFIs) as financial intermediaries to reach those under-served

markets. Most CDFIs specialize in providing access to capital within low-and moderate-income and predominantly minority neighborhoods. In fact, Matt purchased the small business lending data, utilized for the report, to act as a consultant to a CDFI created by a minority-controlled bank. The consulting relationship was never finalized, but the data was definitely put to good use.

Both the federal and state governments had programs to support CDFIs, but there was no local counterpart other than an oversight structure for the local CDFIs created as part of the federal Empowerment Zone program. I successfully advocated, along with others, for the establishment of Empowerment Zone CDFIs in the 1990s during my work at the Philadelphia Commercial Development Corporation and the city's Commerce Department. I was not as successful in advocating for a local CDFI program, beyond the Empowerment Zone initiatives, during the mayoral administrations of Edward G. Rendell and John F. Street.

The Rendell Administration would not consider local CDFI investment, pointing to state and federal programs which already benefited the city – but lending disparities revealed through the 1998 data clearly demonstrate that there was a need to employ new strategies at that time.

The Street Administration took office in the same month as the release of the capital access report. A few months later, my office also released a report on the CDFI industry.

The first bill that I crafted, which became law, simply authorized the City of Philadelphia to invest in promissory notes issued by federally certified CDFIs. Mayor Street signed that bill on May 16, 2000. Street also signed an appropriations bill that I crafted to capitalize a local CDFI fund with \$5 million on November 2, 2001. But the Street Administration made only one investment of \$1.5 million in a CDFI operated by Resources for Human Development, a local non-profit organization. The administration never formalized a local CDFI Fund program and was non-responsive to a proposal submitted by the National Community Capital Association (NCCA) to administer the fund. NCCA, which was locally based, had already provided technical and financial services to scores of CDFIs nationwide.

Not utilizing NCCA's capacity proved that the Street administration did not intend to seriously invest in the CDFI strategy – in part, because the administration didn't fully understand it. But the administration did not offer any other strategies to address disparities in small business lending, although the city was clearly at an economic disadvantage without one, because of the city's demographics.

The Empowerment Zone CDFIs did have moderate success during the Rendell and Street years including the development of a major inner-city shopping center in the West Parkside section of the zone. The shopping center was developed largely due to an equity investment by the West Philadelphia Financial Services Institution, a zone CDFI. A substantial portion of West Parkside zone dollars was invested in the zone CDFI not because of the immediate capacity for small business lending, but because of the

proposed investment in the shopping center. The shopping center would have immediate impact in terms of job creation and the provision of goods and services, while continuing to build future capacity for small business lending in the zone.

The mayoral administration of Michael A. Nutter, through the Commerce Department, is now exploring the utilization of CDFIs to increase access to credit and capital.

### *The Loan Consortium Model and New Landmark Legislation*

The other strategy recommended in the capital access report was the loan consortium model patterned after the Delaware Valley Mortgage Plan (DVMP, now called the Delaware Valley Housing Partnership). The DVMP was created during the initial CRA movement of the 1970's by a number of affordable housing advocates, including my father. Banks and financial institutions, along with other stakeholders, created the DVMP as a vehicle for financial and technical assistance to economically disadvantaged borrowers in under-served areas.

Around the time that I released the capital access report, I met with Sharmain Matlock-Turner, in her capacity as director of the Greater Philadelphia Urban Affairs Coalition (GPUAC). I discussed the small business loan consortium model with her, particularly since GPUAC oversaw the Delaware Valley Housing Partnership which I was seeking to replicate for small business development. We agreed to work together, and several months later, she invited me to present my idea to GPUAC's Committee on Community and Economic Development (CED) in September of 2000. The presentation was well-

received. Ray Desiderio of PNC Bank, co-chair of both GPUAC and its CED committee, promised that he would provide the leadership to implement the loan consortium strategy for small business development. He was probably sincere at the time, but anti-predatory lending legislation later introduced by Councilwoman Marion Tasco angered the banking and financial services industry - and the industry declared war on the legislation. The small business loan consortium idea became a temporary casualty of that war, particularly since I was a co-sponsor of the Tasco legislation. The local banking community decided that all local legislation regarding that industry should be able to be pre-empted by state and/or federal law. The Tasco ordinance was quickly pre-empted by a subsequent state law sponsored by State Representative Dwight Evans. From 2000 into 2001, my loan consortium idea lost almost all of its previous momentum. My only hope was to craft local legislation and policy measures that would not be pre-empted by state or federal law – and 2002 turned out to be a good year for me.

On March 20, 2002, Mayor John F. Street signed Bill # 020047 into law requiring that all banks authorized to receive deposits from the City of Philadelphia must submit an annual statement of community reinvestment goals to the City. The community reinvestment statement must include goals for small business and home loans within low-and moderate- income neighborhoods. Of course, the Pennsylvania Bankers' Association claimed that we were pre-empted from enacting that requirement by previous state legislation, but a City Law Department opinion upheld our right to legislate on city depository issues under authority granted by the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter.

The enactment of that landmark legislation, affirming that the local authorization of city depositories can require community reinvestment statements, was crucial to my future policy work. But it also created further distance between me and the local banking community. In order to still implement my vision for a small business loan consortium, it would require a full-scale war.

That summer, in 2002, I “googled” the term “community reinvestment” and I stumbled upon the website of the National Community Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC). I decided to make a phone call to the NCRC policy director, Josh Silver. Less than 3 years later, I would receive the NCRC National Achievement Award for a government leader advocating for consumer rights and economic justice. That award was the result of several years of work with NCRC on fair lending and community reinvestment policy and legislation.

Just a few months after my initial contact with NCRC, both the president and policy director of the organization agreed to testify at my hearing on lending disparities in Philadelphia during the fall of 2002. At that time, I had just hired Solomon Jones, a Philadelphia Weekly writer and novelist, as senior legislative aide and director of public affairs (which coincided with Matt Quigley’s departure from my office for the Federal Reserve Bank system.) The hearing was Solomon’s first real opportunity to help me impact a major public policy issue. He did well.

Solomon invited the local bank presidents to testify at the hearing, and they promptly declined. Instead, a “delegation” was sent to meet with me - it included Matlock-Turner from GPUAC, Desiderio from PNC Bank, as well as Dede Myers of the local Federal Reserve Bank. The delegation, insisting that it represented the entire local banking community, suggested that the departure of Matt Quigley from my staff gave them the upper hand. They suggested that I didn’t have the necessary technical capacity to challenge their policy position, which would be supported by new data to be presented by Myers of the Federal Reserve Bank. Rather than immediately respond to their insult, I just looked forward to sharing the new data received from NCRC at the hearing.

Solomon did an excellent job of garnering media coverage for the hearing, coordinating advocate support in the presence of small business owners, and providing the “spin” supporting NCRC’s policy position. In short, NCRC testified on the stark disparities that it had uncovered from recent data on lending patterns in Philadelphia, consistent with earlier findings from the Greater Philadelphia Capital Access Report. The Federal Reserve Bank witness could not refute any of NCRC’s testimony.

Furthermore, I asked Mr. Desiderio, for the hearing record, if he had reneged on a commitment to provide leadership in advancing the loan consortium strategy. He admitted that he had reneged on his promise, and recommitted to doing so before the end of the year. GPUAC subsequently formed a Small Business Lending Task Force (SBLTF). The SBLTF, over the next several years, developed a three-tier strategy that resulted in a \$23.5 million GPUAC Business Builder Program targeting low-to-moderate

income and predominantly minority neighborhoods. The launch of the program took almost seven years from my first meeting with GPUAC. Nonetheless, the loan consortium has been established as recommended in our initial report.

### *Other Fair Lending and Community Reinvestment Initiatives*

I have failed to mention that my first legislative initiative was a non-binding resolution calling on the City Controller's Office to conduct an annual study of small business lending. The resolution was unanimously approved by City Council at my first session. Under the administration of Jonathan Saidel, the controller's office issued several reports based on small business lending data from 1998-2004, in compliance with the resolution.


I have also amended the fair lending and community reinvestment requirements for city depositories several times, including - a mandatory compliance provision in 2003, and a fair lending strategic plan provision in 2005.

All of these efforts contributed to an increase in the percentage of small business lending within low-and moderate-income neighborhoods within the city from 42% in 2002 to 55% in 2003, in terms of the number of loans provided by neighborhood income. The percentage of loans has remained around 55% since that time but will hopefully increase through the efforts of the Business Builder Program. As part of that effort, the Nutter Administration is investing \$2 million in a local small business loan guarantee fund, for which I've long advocated, as the final tier in the GPUAC SBLTF strategy. The loan guarantee fund will support both strategies emanating from the capital access report.

## **CDC Economic Development and Job Creation Tax Credits**

### *CDC Economic Development*

The decision to become a legislator meant that I had to quit my job as Economic Development Administrator for the City's Commerce Department and resign from the Philadelphia Commercial Development Corporation (PCDC). Furthermore, as my father instructed me – running for City Council would automatically “politicize” my economic development track record. If I won, it might further validate it – but if I lost, my track record would be both politically and professionally scarred. In reality, my political capital, other than my name, was built upon my professional track record administering community economic development (CED) grant programs - and my work with neighborhood business associations and community development corporations. My expansion of those CED programs was well-documented in the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) Study and Community Reinvestment Report, the two other policy papers released by my office in 2000. Those policy works found that expanding the use of CDBG resources for economic development would leverage more private investment into low-and moderate-income neighborhoods. Economic development investments have always had greater leveraging ability than low-income housing subsidies. Additionally, the utilization of community development corporations (CDCs) to undertake certain economic development activities in disadvantaged neighborhoods would bolster those organizations and their overall revitalization efforts.



In the fall of 2000, I introduced legislation to mandate that a percentage of CDBG resources be allocated to economic development. Ironically, my legislation amended the portion of the Philadelphia Code crafted by then-freshman Councilman John Street, which placed a limit on the economic development use of CDBG dollars. Councilman Street was right (at the time) when he crafted that provision because resources were being taken away from affordable housing development to be invested in economic development projects that did not directly benefit low- and moderate- income neighborhoods. In 2001, I amended my legislation to allocate at least 5 percent of CDBG resources to economic development activities undertaken by CDCs on an annual basis – while still removing the cap on CDBG economic development spending. The amended version was unanimously approved by City Council as part of a broader package of CDC economic development legislation.

That fall, the Philadelphia Association of CDCs was also granted membership on the city's Vacant Property Review Committee (VPRC), which is responsible for land disposition.

The third bill in my fall package of CDC economic development legislation was originally opposed by the Street Administration – its eventual passage has been one of meaningful accomplishment – the CDC Tax Credit Program.

The CDC Tax Credit Ordinance established a pilot program under which a credit against the City's business privilege taxes is given to certain businesses that contribute monies to community development corporations undertaking economic development activities within the City Philadelphia. Up to ten businesses would receive a 100% tax credit for contributing \$100,000 in cash per year for ten years to a qualifying CDC. The businesses would have to enter into a multi-year \$ 1million contribution agreement created by the City's Revenue Department to participate in the program. The program was patterned after the Philadelphia Plan of the 1990's, a state tax credit initiative that focused on providing core operating support to CDCs mostly engaged in affordable housing development. Many CDCs felt left out of the Philadelphia Plan due to the limited opportunities, so the response to the local CDC Tax Credit Program was so overwhelming that the City had fifteen applicants for the original ten slots – and the program was made permanent and expanded to twenty-five slots within a couple of years.

## *CDC TAX CREDIT PROGRAM*



### Business Partner

Obermayer, Redmann, Maxwell & Hippel LLP

Tenet Health Systems Philadelphia, Inc.

Duane Morris LLP

Citizens Bank

Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen LLP

Pep Boys

Penn Distributors

Anthropologie, Inc.

Ernest Bock & Sons, Inc.

Keystone Health Plan East, Inc.

Rittenhouse Claridge, L.P.

Klehr, Harrison, Harvey, Branzburg  
& Ellers, LLP

Coca Cola Bottling of Philadelphia

Reed Smith LLP

Domus, Inc.

Sunoco Oil Company

Wallace Roberts & Todd, LLC

J. J. White, Inc.

P. Agnes, Inc.

Pathmark Stores

PriceWaterhouseCoopers, LLP

Dilworth Paxson LLP

Blank Rome LLP

InTech Construction Inc.

Packer Café

### Community Development Corporation (CDC)

Spring Garden Community Development Corporation

Philadelphia Chinatown Development Corporation

Peoples Emergency Center C DC

Universal Community Homes

Kensington South Community Development Corporation

East Falls Development Corporation

Roxborough Development Corporation

Achieve Ability CDC

Frankford Community Development Corporation

New Kensington Community Development Corporation

Mount Airy USA, a CDC

Project HOME Community Development Corporation

Impact Services Corporation

The Partnership Community Development Corporation

Beech Interplex, Inc.

Schuylkill River Development Corporation

Fairmount Community Development Corporation

Office of Community Development of the Archdiocese

Tacony Community Development Corporation

SOSNA Community Development Corporation

Girard Coalition

Friends Rehabilitation Program Inc.

Asociacion de Puertoriquenos in March

University City District

Delaware River City Corporation

### *Job Creation Tax Credits*

The CDC Tax Credit Ordinance was landmark legislation – it created a local business tax credit for investing in economic development in a fair, transparent, and objective manner. For that reason, then-City Controller Jonathan Saidel asked to meet with me, early in 2002, regarding another local business tax credit that he had previously recommended – a local job creation tax credit. I agreed to “shepherd” the legislation through the legislative process. The legislation would establish a pilot program patterned after the state job creation tax credit which offered businesses that create new jobs - a \$1000 per new job credit against business tax liability.

The legislation, based upon the state tax credit, was one of the only bills from my office that was mostly authored by a member of my staff, Matt Quigley. Matt left my office during an intense period of tax reform debate in City Council – and the intensity of the debate created unanimous support for the job creation tax credit before he left. The debate began when Mayor Street wanted to slow wage tax reductions in order to accelerate reductions in the business gross receipts tax. There is some irony in the fact that the City has both accelerated and slowed wage tax reductions since then, but City Council unanimously approved my legislation, at the beginning of my third term, eliminating the business gross receipts tax by the year 2017. Nevertheless, the Job Creation Tax Credit Program (New Jobs Tax Credit) is already poised to create over 3000 jobs within Philadelphia, in addition to the economic benefits that will come from the eventual gross receipts tax elimination.

### *Incentive for Higher-Paying Jobs*

The New Jobs Tax Credit is an economic development tool that set a standard for job quality because only full-time positions that pay at least 150 percent of the federal minimum wage are eligible for tax credit purposes.

Subsequently, the tax credit ordinance was amended to include an alternative to the \$1000 per new job credit. The amendment, titled “Keep Philadelphia Competitive (KPC) Tax Credit”, offers a credit of two percent of the annual wage of each new job or the original \$1000 credit, whichever is greater.

The KPC Tax Credit was conceived by center city building owners in response to the proposed development of a new Comcast headquarters as a virtually tax-free site under the state’s Keystone Opportunity Zone (KOZ) program. The building owners feared that Comcast would not utilize all of the proposed office space and would be able to steal some of their current and prospective tenants by offering them KOZ benefits, which abate most taxes. The building owners felt that approval of KOZ benefits by local and state government would give Comcast an unfair advantage – and they were right. Instead, they sought the enactment of the KPC Tax Credit legislation creating a multi-year benefit for anyone creating new jobs, as a replacement for the KOZ legislation which would offer benefits to only a few. The building owners lobbied City Council to approve the KPC legislation and to reject the KOZ legislation. Of course, City Council simply approved both measures, after the Street administration forged a compromise on the KPC bill. The administration believed that the multi-year benefit would be too costly, so the legislation

was amended to make it a one-time credit like the New Jobs Tax Credit. I voted against the Comcast KOZ legislation but it was overwhelmingly approved by City Council – only to be rejected by the state legislature. Instead, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania gave Comcast a \$30 million grant for the development project.

The Keep Philadelphia Competitive Tax Credit, as amended, was unanimously approved by City Council and signed into law by the mayor. It is a better incentive for businesses creating higher-paying jobs over \$50,000 annually.

The Nutter Administration is considering a multi-year job creation tax credit in response to similar complaints about other KOZ projects.

### *Ex-Offender Job Creation Tax Credit*

In the summer of 2006, as the murder rate was rising, and the next municipal election was approaching, there was an abundance of law-and-order posturing from prospective candidates. The stupefying competition began over who would hire the most police – in order to reduce the murder rate.

Any rational and objective analysis of murders in this city will always point to a trend of victim-specific crimes that occur mostly among male ex-offenders of color – within a certain age group of high school drop-outs – at certain times of day, in certain places. Even if you deploy more police based upon that analysis, they are certainly not needed citywide to stop most of the murders, which are not random. Similar to the question of

“who shall be poor”, we generally know already who shall kill or be killed in Philadelphia – they are mostly ex-offenders.

As a tool to stem the tide of recidivism for ex-offenders, and hopefully, to save and change their lives, I amended my New Jobs Tax Credit program to reserve a portion of the tax credits for the employment of ex-offenders in 2004. It didn't work. So, during the summer of 2006, I decided to increase the tax credit amount to \$5000 per hire of ex-offenders. I e-mailed Mayor Street about the idea, he responded with immediate support. The amendment creating the increased incentive was unanimously approved by City Council and signed into law by the mayor – but it didn't work either. Nevertheless, it balanced the debate over how to deal with crime and gun violence in this city. More people now acknowledge that recidivism and ex-offender re-entry efforts are as important as the number -and deployment - of police.

### *PREP Tax Credit*

Among those who embraced more balance between better policing and prisoner re-entry efforts was mayoral candidate Nutter, who crafted the Philadelphia Re-Entry Employment Program (PREP) as part of his campaign platform. Nutter voted for my earlier legislative efforts when he was a councilman, but he decided to design his own program for his mayoral administration.

After he won the Democratic nomination to become mayor, he called me during the summer of 2007 and asked if I would introduce his PREP legislation in the fall and

shepherd it through the legislative process. I gladly accepted the challenge.

After negotiations with the Greater Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce, and despite the objections of the Street Administration, the PREP legislation was unanimously approved by City Council and signed into law by Mayor Street. In fact, Nutter returned to City Council to testify on behalf of the PREP bill as the first witness. It remains to be seen how effective PREP will be, but having Mayor Nutter as a vocal advocate for ex-offender employment is a key component.

## **Philadelphia Minimum Wage Standard**

I have introduced over fifty bills in City Council – and about ninety percent of them have already been signed into law. But 2004 was not a very successful year in my legislative career. Only three of the seven bills that I introduced became law, which is the reason that I compromised on the KPC Tax Credit. That year came after all eighteen bills that I previously introduced had become law, including one that required a veto override. I began to lose some confidence – and things got worse before they got better.

In spring of 2005, I saw a news report that a man named “James Goode” was arrested for holding a woman hostage and beating her in the head with a hammer while on a crack binge. There were a few people named “James Goode” in our family but only one that fit the description. I called my immediate family to find out if it could be him. No one was sure. Then, I received a call from the police commissioner, Sylvester Johnson, who asked to visit me in my office. I knew what that meant. The commissioner informed me that it was one of my cousins who had been arrested. I was stunned.

It was not difficult for many people to understand how something like this could happen because the crack epidemic has impacted so many families throughout Philadelphia. But it was still hard for me to reconcile how my family was, in many cases, leading divergent lifestyles. I then questioned myself. If I was not being fully effective as a legislator at the time, was I partially to blame for that type of incident?

I decided that I should seclude myself for awhile – and rethink my legislative agenda. I took the first day to review my work from my first term, as well as my original goals. I concluded that my legislative track record was substantial with regard to community economic development. But I was still practicing “trickle-down” economics, even if the “trickle-down” starting point for me was at the community level and in disadvantaged neighborhoods. Other than the New Jobs Tax Credit – there was nothing that I had done that was directly linked to opportunities for individuals. So I then focused on the New Jobs Tax Credit program, and thought, what else within it could be expanded to create new opportunities for the individuals who are most at-risk?

I eventually had a breakthrough – I realized that the job quality provision of the program needed to be extended beyond the tax credit. The tax credit only applied to jobs that paid at least 150 percent of the federal minimum wage. I decided that a similar standard should be used for other jobs supported by local tax dollars. The idea eventually developed into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Minimum Wage Standard Ordinance, unanimously approved by City Council and signed into law by the mayor on May 26, 2005.

I spent my time, in seclusion at home, researching various models of living wage legislation. After learning from those models, I began to outline my legislation, mostly based upon the Sonoma, CA model that I found on the Living Wage Resource Center Website. The site was developed by ACORN (Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now). I then forwarded my draft to city council’s technical staff to have it put in proper form as an amendment to the Philadelphia Code.

When I returned for the next council meeting, I was ready to introduce the legislation, but I wanted it to be co-sponsored by every member of council. I was concerned about the new measure because a previous attempt to enact living wage legislation failed during the 1990s, before I was a member of council.

After the legislation was co-introduced and sponsored by all seventeen members of council, I quickly arranged for separate meetings with the mayor, the Greater Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce (Chamber), and ACORN.

The Chamber had blocked legislation in the 1990s, in part, because the federal minimum wage had just been raised. Almost a decade later, the state and federal minimum wage had not moved above \$5.15 per hour. The local standard, set at 150 percent, would make \$7.72 the minimum hourly wage for covered employees in Philadelphia. The legislation was crafted, setting the local standard at 150 percent of the state or federal minimum wage (whichever is higher), taking into consideration the changing political dynamics in both the state and federal legislatures. After amendments were negotiated with various stakeholders, we were ready for the hearing. The legislation had been referred to the Commerce and Economic Development Committee, which I chaired since 2004. The Chamber did not testify at the hearing but both ACORN and the Street Administration testified in favor of the amended version.

In July of 2009, the federal minimum wage is set to become \$7.25 per hour – and our local standard would then become \$10.87 for covered employees in Philadelphia. Those

covered by the ordinance include employees of local government and certain city contractors. Unfortunately, the Street administration did not apply the standard to all city contracts covered under the ordinance. Hopefully, the Nutter administration will fully implement the law. Mayor Nutter has already signed my latest amendment into law, establishing at least comparable minimal health benefits for covered employees, a provision patterned after the PREP ordinance.

## Diversity in City Contracting

The Minority Business Enterprise Council (MBEC) was created in the early 1980s before the city had elected its first African-American mayor. Before its creation, businesses owned by people of color and women received next to nothing in terms of city contracting dollars used to purchase goods and services. There was no diversity in city contracting, business owned by white males received over 99 percent of purchasing dollars. And not much was changed by the MBEC ordinance initially, until it was used as a diversity tool by my father's administration, after he was elected mayor.

Mayor W. Wilson Goode, Sr. (1984-1992) was responsible for more contracting with minority- and women-owned businesses – over \$500 million – than all of his predecessors combined. He set the bar higher for his successors, but neither Ed Rendell nor John Street had a passion for diversity in city contracting. Their track records speak for themselves. In fact, one disparity study conducted related to their tenures showed that almost 98 percent of purchasing dollars was still being spent with businesses owned by white males.

Coming into office, almost two decades after the MBEC ordinance, one of my primary legislative goals was to increase city contract participation for disadvantaged business enterprises (DBEs). I was given an early opportunity to promote that agenda with the construction of new sports stadiums for football and baseball. Before City Council gave final approval to the stadium projects, aggressive goals were set for increased DBE participation. But, there were no such goals set for city contracting by Mayor Street.

The biggest challenge to expanding DBE participation in city contracting was simply getting basic information. If we couldn't even receive accurate data on current participation levels, and on a consistent basis, how could we expand participation? The situation became so ridiculous that MBEC testified at budget hearings without offering any new data, year after year, claiming that it was still awaiting the completion of a disparity study that began under the Rendell administration and was not yet completed by the Street years. The strategy appeared to be that, by withholding information, MBEC would avoid any analysis of the administration's track record. In 2003, during an election year for mayor, City Council took legislative action by approving a new ordinance to replace the original MBEC ordinance. The mayor signed the legislation into law in a public ceremony. After he was re-elected, the Law Department, under his supervision, rendered an opinion that the ordinance was invalid because City Council had exceeded its authority under the Home Rule Charter. In that opinion, it was illegal for us to craft legislation on city procurement procedures because that was the exclusive purview of the mayor and his administration.

City Council battled the administration for several years over the matter, still not receiving consistent information on DBE contract participation. But in 2006, I decided to introduce legislation that would change the Home Rule Charter. The charter amendment would not take any procurement power away from the executive branch, but instead, it would add responsibilities to the executive branch. The amendment would require the Finance Director to issue an annual report that analyzes DBE participation and sets participation goals for the next fiscal year. The legislation was unanimously approved by

council on June 1, 2006 and the charter amendment was approved by the voters the next fall.

Through City Council's pressure on the Street Administration, and the charter change approved by voters, DBE participation has risen above 20 percent of total contract dollars in recent reports. The annual disparity study and goal-setting requirement has shone a bright light on diversity in city contracting. The Nutter administration has set its first annual goal at 25 to 28 percent DBE participation.

## CONCLUSION

There is no question that “I do the type of work that I do” because I believe that there should be a direct connection between the political empowerment of disadvantaged people and the creation of economic opportunities for them. That’s simply what I understand as the purpose for politics. But any examination of the politics of economic opportunity will arrive at the same conclusion – most people cast their votes based upon their perceived economic self-interest.

I was encouraged to write about my legislative and policy work by my father – to document how interconnected the work has been over the last 8 ½ years. The purpose was also to demonstrate that there really are legislators who are driven by vision and principle – rather than just “ambulance-chasing” politicians looking for a hot issue.

In my last election, I was honored to have placed first in 37 out of 66 wards. For me, it was a vote of confidence in my work from people who may benefit from it. More importantly, it gives me the opportunity to continue that work.

I chose not to write about every legislative and policy initiative during my tenure- mostly because I’m not finished yet. Instead, this sampling of my work is meant to provide some insight into what it takes to “legislate” new economic opportunities in Philadelphia.

That’s my job, and I’m thankful for it.

APPENDIX

# **GOODE LAWS**

*In the Philadelphia Code*



OFFICE OF  
**W. WILSON GOODE, JR.**  
COUNCILMAN AT-LARGE

## *Fair Lending and Community Reinvestment*

### **CHAPTER 19-200. CITY FUNDS-DEPOSITS, INVESTMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS.**

#### **§19-201. City Depositories.**

(2) Each depository shall:

- (f) provide the City with an annual statement of community reinvestment goals including the number of small business loans, home mortgages, home improvement loans, and community development investments to be made within low and moderate-income neighborhoods in the City of Philadelphia. Each depository shall also certify compliance with Section 17-104 of the Philadelphia Code and provide the City with a long term strategic plan to address disparities in its lending and investment activities. The strategic plan shall address how the depository will match or exceed peer lending performance in targeting capital access and credit needs disclosed in disparity studies commissioned by the City. On July 1 of each year, the City Treasurer shall certify to the President of City Council whether or not each bank and institution on the list of potential City depositories set forth in this section has complied with each requirement of this subsection in the preceding fiscal year and shall withdraw all City funds from any bank or institution that has not complied with each requirement. No funds shall thereafter be deposited in such bank or institution until the bank or institution comes into compliance with each requirement and the City Treasurer has so certified to the President of City Council. The City Treasurer shall provide the President of City Council notification of the withdrawal of, and redeposit of, any City funds pursuant to this subsection.

## *The Local Minimum Wage Standard*

### **CHAPTER 17-1300. PHILADELPHIA 21ST CENTURY MINIMUM WAGE STANDARD.**

#### §17-1301. Purpose.

This chapter shall be known as the "Philadelphia 21st Century Minimum Wage Standard". The purpose of the chapter is to assure that as many employees as possible within the City of Philadelphia earn an hourly wage that enables them to live with more dignity and increased economic self-sufficiency. The City contracts with many businesses and organizations to provide services to the public, and provides financial assistance to developers for the purpose of promoting economic development and job growth. Such public expenditures should also be invested in a better community economic standard. The City Council of Philadelphia finds that the use of City funds to provide better wage jobs will decrease poverty, increase consumer income, invigorate neighborhood businesses and reduce the need for taxpayer funded social service programs. The new minimum wage standard is based on existing local and state job creation tax credit laws.

§17-1302. Definitions. The following words and phrases whenever used in this chapter shall be construed as defined in this section:

- (1) "City." The City of Philadelphia and all City agencies.
- (2) "City financial aid recipients." All persons or entities that receive from the City direct assistance in the form of grants, loans, or loan guarantees, tax incentives, in-kind services, waivers of City fees, or real property in the amount of more than \$100,000 in any twelve (12)-month period. This term shall not include those who enjoy an economic benefit as an incidental effect of City policies, regulations, ordinances, or charter provisions.
- (3) "Service Contractor." Any person or entity that enters into a Service Contract as hereinafter defined.
- (4) "Employee." Any person who performs work for a covered Employer arising directly out of a Service Contract, City financial aid, the grant of a City lease, concession or franchise, or a funding agreement with a public agency, on a full-time, part-time, temporary, or seasonal basis, including employees, temporary workers, contracted workers, contingent workers, and persons made available to work through the services of a temporary services, staffing or employment agency or similar entity. However, Employee shall not mean any person:
  - (1) Employed on a construction project that is covered by federal, state or local prevailing wage requirements;

- (2) Employed during summer months in a program to create summer jobs for students or teenagers;
- (3) Engaged in a bona fide training program, not to exceed 60 days in duration, under which the person will advance into permanent employment; or
- (4) Engaged or participating in a bona fide student internship program.
- (5) "Employer." Those persons with more than five (5) employees, except that no person shall be deemed an Employer until they receive a new contract, lease, concession, franchise, or financial aid from the City. For these purposes the term "new" includes any arrangement entered into after this Chapter becomes effective, or any amendment, extension or renewal of a preexisting arrangement.
- (6) "Non-profit." A non-profit organization described in Section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, which is exempt from taxation under Section 501(c) of that code.
- (7) "Office of Labor Standards." Such office as shall be designated by the Mayor to administer the provisions of this Chapter.
- (8) "Person." Any individual, proprietorship, partnership, joint venture, corporation, limited liability company, trust, association, or other entity that may employ individuals or enter into contracts.
- (9) "Service contract." A contract given to an employer by the City for the furnishing of services to or for the City, except contracts where services are incidental to the delivery of products, equipment or commodities. A subcontract shall be considered a "Service Contract" if it assists in performance of a Service Contract or accepts or transfers any right or responsibility set forth in a Service Contract as defined in this Chapter.

§17-1303. Employers Subject to the Requirements of this Chapter. The employers described below shall comply with the minimum compensation standards established by this Chapter.

- (1) The City of Philadelphia, including all its agencies, departments and offices.
- (2) For-profit Service Contractors, which receive or are subcontractors on contract(s) for \$10,000 or more from the City in a twelve-month period, with annual gross receipts of more than \$1,000,000.
- (3) Non-profit Service Contractors which receive or are subcontractors on contract(s) from the City of more than \$100,000 in a twelve-month period.

- (4) Recipients of City leases, concessions, or franchises, or subcontractors thereof, which employ more than twenty-five (25) employees.
- (5) City financial aid recipients. Compliance shall be required for a period of five (5) years following receipt of aid.
- (6) Public agencies, which receive contract(s) for \$10,000 or more from the City in a twelve-month period.

§17-1304. Waivers.

The Office of Labor Standards may grant a partial or total waiver of these requirements, pursuant to the following:

(1) Any Employer which contends that it is unable to pay all or part of the new wage standard must provide a detailed explanation in writing to the City.

(2) The explanation must set forth the reasons for an Employer's inability to comply with the provisions of this chapter, including a complete cost accounting for the proposed work to be performed with any City funding or assistance that gives rise to coverage under this Chapter, including wages and benefits to be paid all employees, as well as an itemization of the wage and benefits paid to the five highest paid individuals employed by the employer.

(3) The employer must also demonstrate that the waiver will further the interests of the City in creating training positions which will enable employees to advance into permanent jobs paying the new wage standard or better and will not be used to replace or displace existing positions or employees or to lower the wages of current employees.

(4) The City may grant a waiver only upon a finding and determination that the employer has demonstrated economic hardship and that waiver will further the interests of the City in providing training positions which will enable employees to advance into permanent jobs paying the new wage standard or better.

(5) However, no waiver will be granted if the effect of the waiver is to replace or displace existing positions or employees or to lower the wages of current employees.

(6) Waivers from the chapter are disfavored and will be granted only where the balance of competing interests weighs clearly in favor of granting the waiver.

(7) If waivers are to be granted, partial waivers are favored over blanket waivers. Moreover, any waiver shall be granted for no more than one year. At the end of the year, the employer may reapply for a new waiver which may be granted subject to the same criteria for granting the initial waiver.

(8) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section to the contrary, the City reserves the right to waive the requirements of this chapter upon a finding and determination that a waiver is in the best interests of the City.

(9) All of the provisions of this chapter, or any part hereof, may be waived by a bona fide collective bargaining agreement.

§17-1305. Compensation Required to be Paid to Employees. Except as otherwise provided in this Chapter, an Employer subject to this Chapter shall provide its covered Employees the following minimum compensation:

(1) Minimum Wage Standard. The Employer shall pay each Employee an hourly wage, excluding benefits, at least 150% of the federal or state minimum wage, whichever is higher.

(2) Additional compensation permissible. Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to limit an employer's discretion to provide greater wages or benefits to its employees.

§17-1306. Required Contract Provisions.

Every City contract, lease, license, concession agreement, franchise agreement or agreement for financial aid (collectively "contract" or "agreement") with an employer described in this Chapter or amendment thereto shall contain provisions requiring the employer to comply with the requirements of this Chapter as they exist on the date when the employer entered into its agreement with the City or when such agreement is amended. Such agreement provisions shall require the employer to promptly provide to the City documents and information verifying its compliance with the requirements of this Chapter, and provide for sanctions for non-compliance. Such agreement provisions shall also require the employer to notify each of its affected employees with regard to the wages that are required to be paid pursuant to this Chapter.

§17-1307. Exemptions.

(1) An employee for whom application of the requirements of this Chapter is prohibited by state or federal law.

§17-1308. Retaliation and Discrimination Prohibited.

It shall be unlawful to retaliate or discriminate against any person on account of his having claimed a violation of this Chapter.

§17-1309. Private Right of Action.

(1) A person aggrieved by a violation of this Chapter may bring an action against an employer and obtain the following remedies:

(a) Back pay for each day during which the employer failed to pay the compensation required by this Chapter.

(b) Reinstatement, compensatory damages and punitive damages, to the extent such punitive damages are permitted by law.

(c) Reasonable attorney's fees and costs.

(2) Notwithstanding any provision of this Chapter or any other ordinances to the contrary, no criminal penalties shall attach for any violation of this Chapter.

(3) No remedy set forth in this Chapter is intended to be exclusive or a prerequisite for asserting a claim for relief to enforce any rights hereunder in a court of law. This Chapter shall not be construed to limit an employee's right to bring a common law cause of action for wrongful termination.

(4) Nothing in this Chapter shall be interpreted to authorize a claim for damages against the City based upon another employer's failure to comply with this Chapter.

§17-1310. Responsible Bidding and Use of City Funds.

Prior to commencement of the contract's term or execution by the City, each Contractor covered by the bill's requirements will certify to the satisfaction of the City that its employees are paid the minimum wage standard as provided by the Chapter. As part of any bid, application or proposal for any agreement or contract, or other funding arrangement with the City covered by this Chapter, the submitter shall include an acknowledgment, in a form acceptable to the City, of the terms of this Chapter and intent to comply therewith.

§17-1311. Living Wage Advisory Committee.

- (1) Establishment. The City Council shall establish a nine (9) person committee entitled the "Living Wage Advisory Committee," the purpose of which shall be to review the implementation and effectiveness of this Chapter and to make recommendations to the City Council regarding this Chapter.
- (2) Members. The Committee shall be composed of nine (9) members, composed of representatives of the low-income community, labor and businesses, appointed by the City Council, provided that no more than four (4) members are members of the business community. No members of the Committee shall be city contractors, affected employers, or city employees except that at least one (1) member must be appointed to represent the Office of Labor Standards.
- (3) Meetings. The Committee shall meet at least quarterly. All meetings shall be open to the public and will allow for public testimony on policies or conduct relating to this Chapter.

## *Tax Credits for Job Creation and Economic Development*

### **CHAPTER 19-2600.**

#### **BUSINESS PRIVILEGE TAXES.**

##### **§19-2604. Tax Rates, Credits, and Alternative Tax Computation.**

###### **(6) Credit for Contributions to Community Development Corporations.**

(a) *Definitions.* For purposes of this subsection, the following definitions shall apply:

(.1) *Qualifying CDC.* A community development corporation undertaking economic development activities within the City of Philadelphia.

(b) A business shall receive a tax credit of \$100,000 per year against business privilege tax liability for each year the business contributes \$100,000 in cash to a Qualifying CDC under the terms and conditions of this subsection (6).

(c) The tax credit under this subsection (6) shall be available to up to twenty-five (25) businesses that enter into a contribution agreement with the City under which the business agrees to contribute \$100,000 in cash per year for ten consecutive years to a Qualifying CDC designated by the business. No tax credit shall be given for any contributions made by a business to a Qualifying CDC other than pursuant to a contribution agreement with the City executed under the terms and conditions of this subsection (6).

(d) The Revenue Department shall provide application forms for businesses that wish to apply for tax credits under this Section, and it shall enter into contribution agreements under this Section with up to twenty-five (25) applicants on a “first come-first served” basis. The Revenue Department shall when necessary randomly choose among applicants that apply on the same date.

(e) A business may terminate its contribution agreement with the City at any time. A business that terminates a contribution agreement will not lose any tax credits it has taken for contributions made under the contribution agreement, but the business will not be eligible to apply for any future tax credits under this subsection. If a business terminates its contribution agreement, a new business may apply to receive tax credits under this subsection, provided that such tax credits shall be limited to the number of years that were remaining on the terminating business’ contribution agreement, and further provided that the new business must enter into a contribution agreement with the City under which it agrees to make contributions of \$100,000 per year to the same Qualifying CDC which was the recipient under the terminating business’ contribution agreement, and for the number of years that remained under that agreement.

(f) The Revenue Department shall by December 31 of each year submit a written report to the Mayor, with a copy to the President and Chief Clerk of Council, summarizing the City's experience during the prior year with the tax credit provided under this Section.

**(7) Credit for New Job Creation.**

(a) *Definitions.* For purposes of this subsection, the following definitions shall apply.

(1) *Base Period.* The three years preceding the date on which a business may begin creating new jobs which may be eligible for job creation tax credits.

(2) *Job Creation Tax Credits.* Tax credits for which the City of Philadelphia's Revenue Department has issued a certificate under this Chapter.

(3) *New Job.* A full-time job, the average hourly rate, excluding benefits, for which must be at least 150% of the federal minimum wage, created within the City and County of Philadelphia by a company within five (5) years from the start date. Employment opportunities for ex-offenders must be contracted for a minimum period of at least 180 days.

(4) *Start Date.* The date on which a business may begin creating new jobs which may be eligible for job creation tax credits.

(5) *Year One.* A one-year period immediately following the start date.

(6) *Year Two.* A one-year period immediately following the end of year one.

(7) *Year Three.* A one-year period immediately following the end of year two.

(8) *Year Four.* A one-year period immediately following the end of year three.

(9) *Year Five.* A one-year period immediately following the end of year four.

(10) *Ex-offender.* A person previously convicted of a felony, or who was incarcerated for any conviction, or who is currently on probation or parole for any conviction.

(b) *Eligibility.* In order to be eligible to receive Job Creation Tax Credits, a business must demonstrate the following:

(1) A current Job Creation Tax Credit Certificate from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for jobs located in the City of Philadelphia or each of the following:

(i) The ability to create the number of jobs required by the Revenue Department within five (5) years from the start date.

(ii) Financial stability and the project's financial viability.

- (iii) The intent to maintain operations in the City of Philadelphia for a period of five (5) years from the date the company submits its Tax Credit Certificate to the Department of Revenue.
- (iv) An affirmation that the decision to expand or locate in the City of Philadelphia was due in large part to the availability of a Job Creation Tax Credit.

(c) *Application Process.*

(1) *Application.* A business must complete and submit to the Revenue Department a Job Creation Tax Credit Application.

(2) *Creation of Jobs.* The applicant must agree to create at least 25 new jobs or to increase the applicant's number of employees by at least 20%, within five (5) years of the start date.

(3) *Approval.* If the Revenue Department approves the company's application, the Department and the company shall execute a commitment letter containing the following:

- (i) A description of the project.
- (ii) The number of new jobs to be created.
- (iii) The amount of private capital investment in the project.
- (iv) The maximum job creation tax credit amount the company may claim.
- (v) A signed statement that the company intends to maintain its operation in the City of Philadelphia for five (5) years from the start date.
- (vi) Such other information as the Department deems appropriate.

(4) *Commitment Letter.* After a commitment letter has been signed by both the City of Philadelphia and the business, and the City determines that new jobs have been created pursuant to that commitment, the business shall receive a Job Creation Tax Credit Certificate reflecting the number of jobs created and filing information.

(d) *Tax Credits.*

(1) *Maximum Amount.* A business may claim a tax credit in an amount equal to two percent of the annual wages paid for each new job, or \$1,000 per new job created, whichever is higher, up to the maximum job creation amount specified in the commitment letter. The Department shall establish by regulation a methodology by which the annual wages paid by each new job are to be determined.

(2) *Determination of new jobs created.*

- (i) New jobs shall be deemed created in year one to the extent that the business' average employment by quarter during year one exceeds the greater of the business' average employment level during the business' base period or the business' employment level at the start date.
- (ii) New jobs shall be deemed created in year two to the extent that the business' average employment by quarter during year two exceeds the business' average employment by quarter during year one.
- (iii) New jobs shall be deemed created in year three to the extent that the business' average employment by quarter during year three exceeds the business' average employment by quarter during year two.
- (iv) New jobs shall be deemed created in year four to the extent that the business' average employment by quarter during year four exceeds the business' average employment by quarter during year three.
- (v) New jobs shall be deemed created in year five to the extent that the business' average employment by quarter during year five exceeds the business' average employment by quarter during year four.

(3) *Applicable Taxes.* A business may apply the tax credit against the business' total business privilege tax liability.

(4) *Tax Credit Term.* A business may claim the Job Creation Tax Credit for each new job created, as approved by the City of Philadelphia, for a period not to exceed five (5) years from the date the business first submits a Job Creation Tax Credit Certificate to the Department of Revenue.

(5) *Maximum.* The total amount of all tax credits available in any year for commitment under subsection (7)(c)(3) shall not exceed 1% of all revenues collected by the City through the gross receipts and net income components of the business privilege tax during the previous tax year.

(e) *Prohibitions.*

(1) *Prohibitions.* The following actions with regard to Job Creation Tax Credits are prohibited:

- (i) Approval of jobs that have been created prior to the start date.
- (ii) The assignment, transfer or use of credits by any other company.

(iii) Approval for a company which is relocating operations from one location in Philadelphia to another location in Philadelphia.

(2) *Allocations.* Twenty-five percent of all tax credits available in any year under section subsection (7)(d)(5) shall be available for commitment under subsection (7)(c)(3) to businesses with fewer than 25 employees or to create employment opportunities for ex-offenders.

(f) *Penalties.*

(1) *Failure to maintain operations.* A business which receives Job Creation Tax Credits and fails to substantially maintain existing operations and the operations related to the Job Creation Tax Credits in the City of Philadelphia for a period of five (5) years from the date the business first submits a Job Creation Tax Credit Certificate to the Department of Revenue shall be required to refund to the City of Philadelphia the total amount of credit or credits granted.

(2) *Failure to create jobs.* A business which receives job creation tax credits and fails to create the approved number of new jobs within five (5) years of the start date will be required to refund to the City of Philadelphia the total amount of credit or credits granted.

(3) *Waiver.* The Department of Revenue may waive the penalties outlined in subsection (1) and (2) if it is determined that a business' operations were not maintained or the new jobs were not created because of circumstances beyond the business' control. Such circumstances include natural disasters, acts of terrorism, unforeseen industry trends or a loss of a major supplier or market.

(g) The Department of Revenue shall by December 31 of each year submit a written report to the Mayor, with a copy to the President and Chief Clerk of Council, summarizing the City's experience during the prior year with the tax credit provided under this Section.

## About the Author



**W. WILSON GOODE, JR.** was born, raised, and educated in Philadelphia, Pa. He is a graduate of Central High School and the University of Pennsylvania.

With over 220,000 votes in the November 1999 election, the son of the city's first African-American mayor earned a seat on the Council of the City of Philadelphia as an at-large member.

In January 2000, he was sworn in as the youngest member of City Council.

Before his election, Goode worked as an economic development professional and served on key economic development boards and committees from 1992-99.

Chosen as one of Business Philadelphia Magazine's 100 People to Watch and co-author of The Urban League of Philadelphia's report Economic Power: Leveling the Playing Field, Goode is recognized as one of the city's leading authorities on urban economic development.